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CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LOCAL DEMOCRACY,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Stephen J. Schulhofer*

By William J.
Stuntz. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. 2011.
Pp. viii, 312. $35.
THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE.

INTRODUCTION

Universally admired, and viewed with great affection, even love, by all
who knew him, Harvard law professor Bill Stuntz1 died in March 2011 at
the age of fifty-two, after a long, courageous battle with debilitating back
pain and then insurmountable cancer. In a career that deserved to be much
longer, Stuntz produced dozens of major articles on criminal law and procedure. He was a leader in carrying forward the work of scholars who had
analyzed criminal justice through the lens of economic analysis, 2 and he
added his own distinctive dimension by insisting on the importance of political incentives, with their often-perverse effects. 3 Ever the contrarian, Stuntz
excelled at challenging conventional wisdom, usually from a counterintuitive direction. He often succeeded in shaking an accepted consensus; even
readers who remained skeptical were forced to reexamine their fundamental
assumptions about how the criminal justice system works.
The Collapse of American Criminal Justice ("The Collapse") sums up
much of Stuntz's most important work. It brilliantly describes the deplorable
injustices of contemporary criminal justice-most notably our massive levels of incarceration and shockingly disproportionate rates of imprisonment
for minorities. And, in keeping with the style for which Stuntz became famous, it proposes startlingly original solutions.
Stuntz argues that much of the responsibility for our predicament lies,
astonishingly, with the very reforms that were intended to promote greater
fairness and equality in criminal justice-police professionalism, substantive criminal law revision, and the Warren Court revolution in criminal
procedure. In Stuntz's account, the professionalization of policing prevented
local urban districts from using less punitive, community-based methods of
*

Robert B. McKay Professor of Law, New York University. I am grateful for the
comments of Rachel Barkow, David Garland, Erin Murphy, and David Sklansky, as well as for
the exceptionally helpful research assistance of Dennis Ardis, and for the support from the
Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at NYU School of Law.
1. William J. Stuntz was the Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
2. For an example of earlier work in that vein, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedureas a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983).
3. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505 (2001).

1045

Michigan Law Review

1046

[Vol. 111: 1045

social control. The Warren Court's due process revolution gave defense attorneys less reason to focus on questions of genuine innocence and gave
prosecutors stronger incentives to leverage guilty pleas. Legislatures compensated for new difficulties in prosecution by starving the indigent defense
system, enacting broad, easily proved offenses, and ramping up the severity
of punishment. The upshot was less attention to factual guilt; greater prosecutorial control over who gets punished (and how much); and even greater
disparity between rich and poor, between whites and blacks. All this is laid
at the door of police professionalism, criminal justice expertise, and civil
liberties landmarks like Mapp4 and Miranda.5 It is a blistering indictment.
Stuntz's account presents a challenge that no one concerned about constitutional rights or social justice can ignore. The Collapse is not merely a
warning to proceed cautiously. It is an urgent plea to make an immediate
U-turn-to de-emphasize expertise and judicial safeguards and to return
instead to democratic control through small political units. Beyond its criminal justice implications, this argument has broad significance because it
resonates strongly with important preferences in contemporary policy analysis and academic theory-specifically, the public choice approach to
assessing legal change and the school of constitutional thought holding that
long-term reform comes only through democratic politics rather than courts.
For these reasons, the argument warrants an especially thorough assessment. The poor and the vulnerable desperately need protection from state
power and the ignoble instincts that can emerge from majoritarian politics.
If Stuntz's claims are flawed, yet those who seek to protect the disadvantaged lose faith in expertise and the courts because of the doubts that he
raises, the already-fragile safeguards of our criminal justice system and the
social support that those safeguards depend on will be left even weaker than
they already are.
Fortunately, a considerable body of material is available to respond to
the book's challenge. This Review takes up that assignment. Part I summarizes Stuntz's argument. Part II turns to the book's historical claim-that
before the 1960s, the justice system outside the South worked reasonably
well. The evidence, taken as a whole, shows a very different picture. To be
sure, crime rates and imprisonment rates were low by today's standards, but
in other respects the pre-1960 systems had grave shortcomings.
Part III turns to the book's two causal arguments-that the positive features that prevailed before 1960 (low rates of crime and imprisonment) were
due in part to informality and local political control; and that these advantages evaporated partly because of professionalization, expanded
procedural safeguards, and the erosion of local democracy. These claims too
are at odds with the great weight of the evidence. The worst defects in criminal justice before 1960 flowed directly from the localized politics and weak
procedural protections that Stuntz seeks to restore. There is no basis for giving those mechanisms any credit for that era's low rates of crime and
4.
5.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Miranda v.Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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imprisonment. Rather, those advantages flowed from social conditions that
changed with astonishing speed in the 1960s and that are unlikely ever to
return. Properly understood, the history suggests that restoring political
power to local neighborhoods cannot help cure-and likely would aggravate-the ills of contemporary criminal justice.
Part IV considers the book's proposals for concrete reforms. Because its
principal theme-the value of localized democracy-appears in other currents of contemporary scholarship,6 steps to return some decisionmaking
authority to the local level could have merit whether or not the book's history withstands scrutiny. But surprisingly (given the analysis that dominates
the first three-quarters of the book), The Collapse suggests few steps to
reempower neighborhoods. Instead, while Stuntz continues to insist that
decisions like Mapp and Miranda were unwise and would best be overturned, his own proposals for reform envisage a dramatically expanded
judicial role in protecting minorities and the poor. Indirectly, but tellingly,
the book's remedial proposals reinforce the conclusion that emerges from
assessing its historical analysis: local political control of the sort America
had before 1960 is no longer a viable option. Rather, constitutional limits on
law enforcement, vigilantly enforced by courts, remain indispensable elements in the institutional design of a democratic society.

1. THE THESIS OF THE COLLAPSE
A vivid comparison frames Stuntz's thesis. On one side of the ledger, contemporary criminal justice is a mess: prisons are bursting, sanctions are
shockingly unequal, outcomes are almost entirely determined by prosecutors'
unchecked discretion, and crime rates remain stubbornly high (pp. 1-2). Yet,
Stuntz argues, "It was not always so" (p. 2). For roughly sixty years, from the
1890s through the 1950s, American states outside the South "punished sparingly, mostly avoided the worst forms of discrimination, [and] controlled
crime effectively .... [C]riminal justice worked" (p. 2).
What accounts for this shift? What happened in the 1960s to make that
period a turning point? The signal legal events of that era, of course, were
the civil rights and due process "revolutions." But few would expect that
those developments, designed to enhance the decency of American institutions, made our society more punitive and more discriminatory. Stuntz,
however, argues that those reforms had calamitous consequences-not just
for "law and order" but for equality and fairness (Chapter Eight). Although
he briefly acknowledges that other forces contributed to contemporary ills,
Stuntz focuses primarily on the unexpected political and legal dynamics
that, he argues, were unleashed by efforts to improve criminal procedure and
substantive criminal law.
At the core of The Collapse is Stuntz's argument that the "experts" who
perpetrated these reforms-police professionals and the Warren Court for

6.

See DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 86-93 (2008) (summa-

rizing these arguments).
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criminal procedure; academics and the American Law Institute for substantive law-bear much of the responsibility for the collapse of practices that
were largely successful for more than half a century: "[P]rofessionals and
experts changed the justice system almost entirely for the worse" (p. 194).
Why did reforms grounded in expertise and good intentions backfire so
catastrophically? Although Stuntz brings diverse perspectives and a wealth
of data to his argument, his principal analytic device is that of political
economy: he works from the incentives of self-interested legal and political
actors to demonstrate how we can expect each new development to percolate through multilayered institutions.
Consider police professionalism-formal training, civil service protection for officers, and a hierarchical chain of command-as a replacement for
neighborhood control of precinct captains and cops on the beat. The costs of
crime and the effects of punishment on wrongdoers and their families are
concentrated, Stuntz writes, in the local communities where victims and
perpetrators typically live in close proximity.7 When prosecutors, police
chiefs, and subordinate officers were political actors closely attuned to
neighborhood priorities, the affected communities had to balance desires for
vengeance and safety against needs for fairness to offenders and suspects.
Now that professionalization has taken hold, however, criminal justice policy is mostly set by bureaucrats responsible to more distant constituencies,
largely affluent and white, whose members can act on their desires for harsh
punishment without bearing its costs (pp. 31-39).
Similarly, consider through the lens of political economy the effect of
new procedural rights. Attorneys have only so many hours and resources
available to defend their clients; meanwhile, the new Warren Court due process rights, Stuntz claims, are mostly unrelated to the question of guilt
versus innocence (pp. 227-30). Because defense attorneys have a duty to
raise procedural defenses when possible, every minute spent invoking a new
procedural right will, he claims, inevitably "siphon[] the time of attorneys
and judges away from the question of the defendant's guilt" (p. 228). Indeed, Stuntz argues, the Bill of Rights itself was wrongheaded from the
beginning in emphasizing procedural guarantees (pp. 79-80). And when a
court focuses, as the Warren Court did, on procedural safeguards rather than
substantive protection-such as a ban on unduly severe sentences-a legislature can easily enable prosecutors to avoid the new barriers: it need only
criminalize trivial conduct that is easy to prove (such as speeding, or possession of small drug quantities), ramp up the available punishments, and
withhold adequate funding for indigent defense. And this, Stuntz argues, is
precisely what happened after the 1960s in response to procedural barriers
that the Warren Court had erected (pp. 260-65).
The chain of bad consequences does not stop there, Stuntz suggests, for
two further reasons: new procedural obstacles incentivize prosecutors to
induce guilty pleas, and the tools newly made available to circumvent those
obstacles-multiple charges and more severe sentences-make it easier than
7.

See pp. 6-7.
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ever for prosecutors to do so. As a result, he argues, these new constitutional
safeguards drive down the rate of adjudications at trial (pp. 235-36). Prosecutors induce many more defendants to plead guilty in plea procedures that
afford them almost no safeguards at all (pp. 257-63). And again, in Stuntz's
account, this is precisely what happened: the guilty plea rate rose sharply
(pp. 139, 264). Adding insult to injury, innocent defendants (those most likely to benefit from trial) are, Stuntz says, harmed by this dynamic more than
guilty defendants are. (pp. 264, 302). The net effect, paradoxically, is fewer
safeguards, less transparency, more severe punishment, and greater unfairness.
If these claims are sound, the reform efforts of the 1960s were disastrously misguided. An urgent imperative follows: we must relax the
procedural safeguards of the Warren era and return to localized democratic
control of criminal justice. The remaining Parts of this Review assess the
distinct steps in that argument.

II. AMERICA

BEFORE

1960-DID CRIMINAL

JUSTICE WORK?

The Collapse makes striking descriptive claims. Stuntz asserts that prior
to 1960, crime, punishment, and-outside the South--discrimination were
quite low or moderate by today's standards. All these measures, he argues,
began to rise in the 1960s. Then, beginning in 1970, they rose precipitously
for about two decades. Simultaneously, "jury trials, once common, became
rare events," and "a locally run justice system grew less localized, more centralized" (p. 7). These parallel trends-diminishing local control over
criminal justice alongside diminishing fairness and public safety-set the
stage for Stuntz's central thesis: the former, he says, contributed significantly to the latter.8 To provide a context for considering that causal claim, this
Part examines the state of criminal justice pre-1960.
Whether criminal justice prior to 1960 really did "work" and whether
"[i]t doesn't anymore" (p. 2) are inevitably matters of degree. Short of complete anarchy, the institutions of any society necessarily "work." To appraise
conditions overall, we need to examine the strengths and shortcomings of
earlier eras in depth and along multiple dimensions. In The Collapse, Stuntz
acknowledges that pre-reform institutions were imperfect, but he mentions
defects--corruption, brutality, and discrimination-only in broad strokes,
always emphasizing that successes in controlling crime with modest levels
of punishment far outweighed these shortcomings.9 Yet numerous authori0
ties insist that criminal justice before the 1960s was in disarray.' Of course,
"[C]orrelation does not prove causation. But this coincidence seems more than
8.
coincidental." . 7.
9. For representative passages, passing lightly over the flaws during the 1880-1930
period, see pp. 31, 142.
See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUS10.
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY vi (1967) [hereinafter 1967 CRIME
COMM'N] (finding "overwhelming evidence" of institutional shortcomings throughout the
United States); U.S. NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, WICKERSHAM
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the book's point is to challenge conventional wisdom, so it will not do simply to cite sources with different views. We have to weigh the evidence.
Fortunately, the evidence is largely consistent and can be summarized
with little oversimplification. The picture it presents is not one of effective,
locally based institutions nicely accommodating diverse community needs.
Rather, it shows in convincing depth and detail that informal administration,
localized politics, and freedom from professional norms produced dysfunctional systems. Stuntz's treatment-and the broader contemporary nostalgia
for the era of majoritarian politics with few judicial checks-suggests a
need to recover the lessons of that time. It is therefore worth recalling in
detail what informality and localized political control meant in practice.
A. The Early 1920s and Before

In the 1870s and 1880s, civic commissions in several major cities initiated investigations of their police. The 1890s saw a proliferation of such
commissions, all of which "demonstrated ...convincingly that corruption
and incompetence were endemic to the big-city police."11 These reports
were of uneven quality, but a 1922 report that rigorously surveyed criminal
justice in Cleveland-then America's fifth largest city-presents an exceptionally careful and complete picture of American criminal justice early in
the twentieth century. 2 Despite its local focus, the Cleveland Report makes
clear that "[tihe deep-seated causes for [conditions in Cleveland] will be
found in other cities throughout the country."'13 It captures, in impressive
detail, conditions at the beginning of the 1920s, before Prohibition compli14
cated the picture.
The Cleveland Bar Association and other civic groups commissioned the
Cleveland Report in 1920.5 Far from thinking that their justice system
worked, members of these civic groups believed that their city faced a crisis.
Felix Frankfurter, in a preface to the 750-page report, explained, "For some
time previous [to 1920] Cleveland had been restive under a growing feeling
of insecurity of life and property. [The city] entertained a wide-spread conviction of its failure in the most primitive function of government."' 6 To
address those concerns, the civic groups initiated a comprehensive empirical
study under the direction of Frankfurter and Roscoe Pound. The effort,
COMM'N REPORTS No. 11, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) [hereinafter WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS]; Samuel Walker, Origins of the
Contemporary CriminalJustice Paradigm:The American Bar FoundationSurvey, 1953-1969,
9 JUST. Q. 47, 56-58 (1992) (noting pervasive lawlessness and racism in the 1950s).
11.

ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 10-11 (1977).

12. THE CLEVELAND FOUND., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (Roscoe Pound &
Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922) [hereinafter CLEVELAND REPORT].
13. Felix Frankfurter, Preface to CLEVELAND REPORT, supra note 12, at v-vi.
14. Under the Volstead Act, Prohibition took effect in two stages-in October 1919 and
February 1920. See ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919), repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
15.

Frankfurter, supra note 13, at v.

16.

Id.
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Frankfurter noted, produced few surprises. The study's value lay in its convincing documentation: "[The situation was] already suspected ....The
point is that the survey proved it."' 7
The crime problem in Cleveland was more alarming than many had
thought. With a population of eight hundred thousand in 1920, Cleveland
had six times as many murders and seventeen times as many robberies as
London, a city ten times its size.1 8 In fact, there were "more robberies and
assaults to rob in Cleveland every year than in all of England, Scotland, and
Wales put together."' 9 Cleveland's predicament, moreover, was not unusual
for America. Compared to Cleveland, St. Louis had roughly twice as many
robberies and burglaries.2" And Chicago, although three times bigger than
Cleveland, had five times as many murders. 21 Whatever we may think of
these 1920 levels of crime, contemporaries did not consider their criminal
justice systems successful.
In separate chapters devoted to police, prosecution, and the courts, the
Cleveland Report details the reasons for this predicament. The problems,
common to all three areas, centered on informality, political influence, haphazard procedures, and the failure to adopt management practices suited to
agencies whose size, like that of the city itself, had exploded. Lack of professionalism affected operations in all areas. The police force consisted of
nearly 1,400 officers, but these personnel did not bring expertise to the job;
most were recruited from occupations like carpentry and plumbing, which
provided no preparation for police work. 22 Turnover of commanders and
patrol officers was rapid, supervision was "ragged," and lines of authority
were "so vaguely drawn that effective administration would be impossible
even under the best of conditions. 2 3 For prosecution, "traditions and meth' 24
Case
ods [were still those] shaped at the time of the Civil War.
management was "casual," and positions for assistant prosecutors were
"treated as so many political jobs to be handed out"; candidates, chosen "on
different racial groups," then
the basis of politics or of allotment among the
25
became "largely independent functionaries.
The courts mirrored these features. The number of judges had mushroomed, but with no central system for assignments, cases were shifted for
no apparent reason. 26 Although judges no longer had personal knowledge of
17.
18.
12, at 3.

Id.
Raymond B. Fosdick, Police Administration, in CLEVELAND

19.

Id.

20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 6, 25-26.

REPORT,

supra note

23. Id. at 7-8.
24. Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice and the American City, in CLEVELAND
supra note 12, at 559, 620.
25. Id. at 621, 623, 625.
26. Id. at 629.

REPORT,
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the people appearing before them, written records and the ability to retrieve
them were primitive, leaving judges in the dark when passing on bail, dis27
missals, and sentencing.
The Report's authors saw little virtue in informality and grassroots political influence, the very features that Stuntz presents as sources of success.
For the authors, "transient administration is fatal to success in any complex
technical enterprise. '' 28 Of course, Pound, Frankfurter, and their collaborators were professionals and experts; their preference for professionalism and
expertise is not surprising. But before dismissing their assessment as ideologically biased, we must consider the evidence that shaped it. Their reports
document in detail why they viewed policing, prosecution, and the courts as
"complex technical enterprise[s]" requiring systematic management.
First, take policing. Its old basis in personal relationships and local rapport had disappeared forever. "From a town in which many people knew
29
each other intimately ... Cleveland has become ... a city of strangers."
Heterogeneity, anonymity, and instability even characterized individual precincts:
It is not unusual for a migration of population to occur which completely
alters the police problem of a district. The influx of negroes, which has occurred in the Eighth Precinct, presents a new police problem, and so does
the mixture of races in the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Precincts. ... [T]here

have been instances of rapid change from good residential districts, with a
permanent population, to boarding-house and furnished-room districts, accommodating a transient population.3"
In short, the beguiling vision of cohesive communities had passed out of
reach. Informality and local control were "one of the legacies of pioneer
America [but they] result[ed] in almost complete want of continuity in administration ... [and] waste of time and effort .... The pioneer notion of
short tenure and selection from among the voters of a politico-geographical
3
area is out of place in the city of today." '
Those structures of informality and grassroots influence go a long way
toward explaining the malleable charging practices, low conviction rates,
and mild sentences that Stuntz admires, but the Cleveland Report spells out
what those outcomes represented for the people who experienced them at
the time. Casual case management caused delay, "serial unpreparedness,"
and "laxity" at every stage.32 Bail hearings, dismissals, and trial preparation
were handled as "a perfunctory routine," even to the point of prosecutors'

27.

See id. at 629-32; see also Reginald Heber Smith & Herbert B. Ehrmann, The
CLEVELAND REPORT, supra note 12, at 229, 322-23, 326.
Fosdick, supra note 18, at 7.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 55.
Pound, supra note 24, at 615.
Alfred Bettman & Howard E Bums, Prosecution, in CLEVELAND REPORT, supra
at 85, 172.

Criminal Courts, in

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
note 12,
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"perfunctory acquiescence in suspension or mitigation of sentence."33 And
there seems to be no evidence that prosecutors reserved this lenity only for
defendants from their own ethnic communities. Cases were "throw[n] ...at
[assistants] as chance dictates," and laxity was universal. Among other effects, these conditions created ever-present "opportunities for favoritism or
corruption or abuse or extortion," with resulting "suspicion of the whole
administration of justice."34

The courts failed to counteract these distortions and often compounded
them. Although judicial elections had once yielded judges of good reputation with a degree of political accountability, the average citizen no longer
had any reliable means to assess the qualifications of judicial candidates; 3the "attempt[] to adapt the democracy of the town meeting to a great cosmopolitan population" had mostly produced only incompetence and
corruption.

36

Even the best judge, moreover, could seldom correct malfunctions. Judicial approval was nominally required for prosecutors' motions to nolle
(dismiss) a case, but a high volume of cases and judges' inability to access
information meant that such oversight, which had "flourished successfully
under ...rural conditions,' 37 had "decay[ed] into an empty form" 38 Prosecutors sometimes "clean[ed] house" by using a "blanket nolle" to dismiss as
many as four hundred cases in a single motion. 39 For cases that remained,
defense lawyers easily steered clients to compliant judges and used their
knowledge of weak points to work the system for dismissals; "the most successful players of this game" were primarily "criminals by profession." 40
For cases that were not dismissed, jury trials were uncommon. In
1920, out of 2,608 misdemeanor cases, less than 1 percent (only fifteen
cases) were tried to a jury; among felony cases, guilty pleas accounted for
77 percent of convictions. 41 Because there was no stenographic record of
preliminary hearings, moreover, perjury in subsequent proceedings was
"rife. '42 And because judges normally could not retrieve court records,
"the habitual offender," even if convicted, could easily manipulate the system to escape punishment.43 These were the specifics that led Frankfurter
to see not a well-working system but instead a "breakdown."" Growth and

33.
34.

Pound, supra note 24, at 621, 623-25.
Id. at 625-26; Bettman & Bums, supra note 32, at 207-08.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Pound, supra note 24, at 629.
Smith & Ehrmann, supra note 27, at 260.

40.

Bettman & Bums, supra note 32, at 238, 244.

41.
42.

Id. at 231 n.3, 236-37.
Pound, supra note 24, at 621; see also Bettman & Bums, supra note 32, at 116.

43.
44.

Bettman & Bums, supra note 32, at 238, 244.
Frankfurter, supra note 13, at vi.

Id. at 328.
Pound, supra note 24, at 630.
Smith & Ehrmann, supra note 27, at 328.
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industrialization had "turn[ed] into a menace the early American machinery
and methods of law enforcement. 45
B. The Late 1920s

Surveying the entire country a few years later, President Herbert Hoo46
ver's Crime Commission found conditions like Cleveland's everywhere.
The Commission-known by the name of its chair, Hoover's attorney general George W. Wickersham---conducted research in the late 1920s and
issued its reports in 1931-1932. 41 It is best known today for its finding that
police brutality in interrogation-the "third degree"-was systematic. 4' But
its broader surveys of criminal justice institutions are more relevant here,
and they provide even greater depth and detail than the Cleveland Report.
Nationwide, the commissioners believed, criminal justice was not working: perceptions of rampant crime had "caused a loss of public confidence in
the police" and left "the citizen [feeling] helpless in the hands of the criminal class. '49 Although Prohibition was a major source of difficulty for law
enforcement, the Commission found that the principal problems were not
specific to Prohibition; they were structural and institutional.
With respect to the police, the Commission pinpointed as the principal
evil the "insecure, short term of service of the chief."50 In larger cities, the
average tenure for a police chief was less than two and a half years, and his
departure invariably produced "a more or less general shake-up of the subordinates from captains [down to] patrolmen ....

[C]orporate business of

any magnitude conducted on such short terms of service by its executive[s]
...would soon find itself bankrupt." 51 Moreover, the chief was often "wholly incompetent" and, as the mayor's personal appointee, he was frequently
obliged "to go easy on this or that criminal ... who are in alliance with [the
mayor's] patrons."5"
The problems for police administration at the top--incompetence and
political influence-were repeated all down the line53: "The second outstanding evil ... is the lack of competent, efficient, and honest patrolmen
.... Even where there are civil service examinations, the hand of the politi45.

Id.

46.

Nearly all the cities surveyed were outside the South. See generally

COMM'N, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS,
SERVANCE

AND

ENFORCEMENT,

supra note

WICKERSHAM

10; U.S.
COMM'N

WICKERSHAM

NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBREPORTS

No. 4,

REPORT

ON

PROSECUTION (1931) [hereinafter WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON PROSECUTION]; U.S.
NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, WICKERSHAM COMM'N REPORTS
No. 14, REPORT ON POLICE (1931) [hereinafter WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON POLICE].

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See, e.g., reports cited supra note 46.
See WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON

53.

Id. at 3-4.

LAWLESSNESS, supra note

WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON POLICE, supra note

Id.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2-3.

46, at 1.

10, at 173-80.
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cian is all too plainly visible in [appointments and] promotions. 5 4 Qualifications were minimal, and training, with few exceptions, was negligible.55
While that approach had been tolerable in "rural or small-town policing,"
modem urban conditions multiplied the duties cast upon each officer and
compounded the "opportunit[ies] for graft."56 Police needed to develop "a
scientific procedure, in which men are given professional education, are
and to employ trained
trained to use the latest resources of modem 5science
7
intelligence as a substitute for... mere force.
Despite the ethos of informality and political influence that dominated
most departments, however, this was not a period when ethnic communities
were policed by "their own." The Commission found that people often mistrusted cops on the beat because the officers were unfamiliar with the
language and customs of recent immigrant communities. As a result, residents were "unwilling[] to expose a criminal of their race."58 In addition to
the need for better education and training for police, cities needed "more
police officers ...on each force who are of such races and familiar with
their language ... and cultural background."5 9

The Commission's assessment of prosecution and the courts likewise
mirrored the Cleveland Report and added considerable detail. In practically
every city surveyed, the court system handled guilty pleas, dismissals, and
trials in a "haphazard, inadequate, and careless" manner. 60 Docket management was "poor."6 1 Repeated continuances wore down witnesses and forced

cases to be dropped but did not guarantee thoughtful treatment of cases that
survived.62 Instead, trial proceedings were chaotic. 63 In large cities, guilty
pleas predominated-ranging from a low of 61 percent of all convictions in
Milwaukee to over 80 percent in Chicago, St. Louis, and New York'-and
the background facts available at sentencing were minimal.65

Overall, in virtually every city surveyed, the lack of systematic administration produced breakdown and dysfunction. Yet the Commission, unlike
Stuntz, did not attribute high rates of dismissal and lenient sentences to
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at9.
Id. at 6.
Id. at7.

60. Alfred Bettman, Criminal Justice Survey Analysis, in WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 46, at 39, 93, 95-96, 98-102. Of the cities surveyed, only
Philadelphia was judged an exception to this pattern. Id.at 103. The Commission explicitly
endorsed the Bettman analysis. See WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra
note 46, at 4-5.
61. Bettman, supra note 60, at 106-07, 114-15.
62.
63.

Seeid. at 118.
See id. at 115-16.

64.
65.

See id. at 206.
Id. at 135-37.
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measured, empathic decisionmaking; rather, it concluded-with detailed
support-that case outcomes were the result of inattention, unpreparedness,
inadequate information, and "a rapidity and casualness that precluded all
possibility66 of careful knowledge or analysis of the facts or of intelligent disposition.

Divided political responsibilities and localized control compounded all
these problems. One leading beneficiary of this Balkanization was "organized crime [which] takes advantage of the complexity of the governmental
organization of metropolitan [areas]. ' 67 The Commission saw existing political units as "illogical geographical divisions" hampered in "dealing with
problems whose geographical units do not correspond to those of society's
organs for solving them. '68 All told, "the inefficiency of the 6apparatus"
left
9
society with "a curiously ineffective way of protecting itself."
C. The 1950s and Early 1960s

By 1950, reformers had succeeded in insulating many police departments from the influence of local ward leaders, and use of the "third degree"
had waned.70 But training of patrolmen remained minimal, and most departments were still run informally without systematic lines of command.7 1

Most departments, even in big cities, retained the deficits that the Wickersham Commission had identified in 1931.
Writing in 1954, William H. Parker, chief of police in Los Angeles, described a justice system prone to "spectacular police failures."72 Although
many large police departments had better training and administration, and
although almost all had benefited from technological advances (motorized
patrol and radio dispatch), Parker reported that "the police service today
fulfills its task with no greater success than it did a quarter-or half-century
ago."7 3 Ironically, Parker observed, even where police were still organized

informally with relatively little supervision, that approach did not translate
into strong relationships with communities because "[i]nstead of analyzing
the causes for lack of [community] support and working toward their eventual removal, police have all too often withdrawn into a shell."74
Professionalization, Parker explained, was imperative:

66.
67.
68.

Id. at 115.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 155.

69. Id. at 155-56.
70. See SKLANSKY, supra note 6, at 34-36.
71. See id. at 36 (describing the "second wave" of police reform in the 1950s and 1960s
as primarily focused on "streamlining operations, strengthening lines of command, [and] raising the quality of personnel").
72. William H. Parker, The Police Challenge in Our Great Cities, ANNALS Am.ACAD.
POL. & Soc. Sci., Jan. 1954, at5, 6.
73.
74.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 5.
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[T]he typical great city of the United States [involves] so many people of
varied beliefs and modes of conduct ... liv[ing] so interdependently that
food, shelter, and even their very movement on the streets require delicately balanced co-operation ....

... Police inefficiencies which may go nearly unnoticed in the relatively
stable pattern of rural life ... [have] grave import [in] the fast-paced social
and economic turmoil of the larger cities ....

• .. [Moreover,] [n]o single officer can effectively perform in the diverse
and highly technical fields which police science has created ... [As in
medicine,] [tihe fact that Prairie Junction will not support a group of medical specialists does not make this situation an ideal to be followed in
Chicago ....

... [Organized crime is] too cleverly conducted to respond to suppression
by any unplanned combination of patrol and investigation.75

During this period, reformers launched two major efforts to assess impressions like these more systematically-one by the American Bar
Foundation and a second by another presidential commission. The Bar
Foundation organized extensive field research during 1955-1957, with
teams directly observing criminal justice agencies in operation. The researchers observed "a great deal of lawlessness, racism, and casual
unprofessional conduct. ' ' 76 And these observers did not view the brutality
and discrimination they saw as merely the episodic lapses of a generally
sound system. In Detroit, for example, one researcher "observed the police
routinely breaking into buildings to obtain evidence or make arrests, harass'77
ing homosexuals, and arresting prostitutes in massive 'sweep' arrests.
"Officials not only flouted the law; often they were completely ignorant of
it.... The willful mistreatment of black citizens was pervasive."78 In the
early 1960s, reports continued to stress the existence of pervasive police
lawlessness and abuse. Between 1960 and 1963, eight major cities "experienced police scandals of corruption and burglary, all of which received
nationwide publicity."79
The circumstances were judged so dire that there was once again a national demand for systematic study and assessment. In July 1965, President
Lyndon B. Johnson established yet another presidential commission charged

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 5-6, 10, 12.
Walker, supra note 10, at 57.
Id.
Id. at 58.
Lawrence W. Sherman, The Sociology and Social Reform of the American Police:

1950-1973, 2 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN. 255, 256 (1974).
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with responding to a sense of crisis." His Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice reported back in February 1967 after gathering most of its data in 1965 and 1966.81 Crime was on the rise, but the due
process reforms Stuntz criticized in The Collapse had just begun and had yet
to have much impact on the ground. For the most part, this was still the
world viewed rather favorably in The Collapse, the world in which criminal
justice "worked" because rates of crime and imprisonment, and disproportionate black incarceration, were quite low by today's standards.
Contemporaries did not hold such a benign view. In its national survey,
the Johnson Commission found that "crime ... and the fear of crime have
eroded the basic quality of life of many Americans.... One-third of a representative sample of all Americans say it is unsafe to walk alone at night in
their neighborhoods. 8 2 Unfairness was rampant and "[tihe Commission
found overwhelming evidence of institutional shortcomings in almost every
83
part of the United States."
Even in 1965, police training was limited; less than half of cities with
populations between 100,000 and 250,000 people provided recruits with
more than five weeks of training. 84 In the courts, the failings that had been
noted thirty and forty years before persisted. Prosecutors and judges still
relied on information systems "designed originally for small, rural communities" where "the parties involved ... often know each other," and as a

result decisionmakers "seldom know anything at all about a defendant's
background [or] character." 85 In the lower courts, "cramped and noisy courtrooms, undignified and perfunctory procedures, and badly trained personnel
[led to] the impossibility of devising constructive solutions to the problems
86
of offenders.
In sum, the relatively attractive portrait of this era's criminal justice process sketched in The Collapse is in tension with a sizeable body of evidence.
Those who studied their own systems at the time did not think that typical
case outcomes were a product of considered leniency. Rather, they considered the case dispositions to be the result of hasty, haphazard procedures,
incompetent staff, and the inability to access relevant information. They saw
their systems as badly dysfunctional.

80.
81.

1967 CRIME COMM'N, supranote 10, app. A at 311.
Id.

82.

Id. atv.

83.

Id. at viii.

84.
THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 11 tbl.6 (1967) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TASK FORCE
REPORT].

85.

1967 CRIME COMM'N, supranote 10, at 127.

86.

Id. at 128.
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D. Looking Back on the Pre-1960 Critiques

Is there good reason to doubt these contemporary assessments of informality and localized political control? In retrospect, we know that the elites
of the period, in their abhorrence of discretion and faith in expertise, were
"hopelessly naive." 87 In seeking to rely so heavily on "scientific management' s8 they undoubtedly failed to allow for justified discretion and
legitimate willingness to forego full enforcement of every law. Nonetheless,
their argument for specialization, greater professionalism, and substantial
on the
insulation from politics cannot fairly be questioned; the observers
89
steps.
these
for
need
the
detail
compelling
in
documented
scene
By the 1920s, the larger cities of the Northeast and Midwest had become
complex, dynamic, and heterogeneous.9" By the 1950s, cities throughout the

nation were changing in the same way. Even the small precincts within these
cities typically had little in common with rural towns of comparable population. Unlike those somewhat self-contained societies where families lived
together for generations, America's urban districts were increasingly

marked, as they are today, by anonymity and constant change. 91 Mutual in-

among
adjacent
frequent interaction
terdependence 92 required
neighborhoods and with the central business district. Police departments
needed specialized units, and their generalists-the patrolmen-also required special training to maintain order on densely crowded streets used by
many people they could not possibly know personally. 93 And except with

respect to certain quality-of-life offenses, local independence in setting enforcement policy was precluded by citywide social and economic

Walker, supra note 10, at 54.
For the classic exposition of the "scientific management" theory, see FREDERICK
WINSLOW TAYLOR, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT passim (Routledge 2003) (1947). For a discussion of Taylor's influence on thinking about police administration during this period, see
Sherman, supra note 79, at 256.
89. See Walker, supra note 10, at 56-59 (describing the extensive field research documenting the need for reform of the criminal justice system).
90. See Fosdick, supra note 18, at 6-7, 55 (describing Cleveland in the early 1920s as
"a city of strangers" and noting the instability of neighborhoods, with influxes of new population groups and "instances of rapid change" from one kind of neighborhood to another).
91. See Parker, supra note 72, at 5-6 (describing heterogeneity and "fast-paced social
and economic turmoil" in large American cities of the 1950s and contrasting that situation
with "the relatively stable pattern of rural life"); cf. Fosdick, supra note 18, at 6-7 (describing
urban conditions in the 1920s).
92. See Parker, supra note 72, at 5 (describing interdependence of residents in large
American cities in the 1950s).
93. See Parker, supra note 72, at 5-6, 10 (describing the complexity of order maintenance among heterogeneous groups "even [with respect to] their very movement on the
streets" and the need for special training for officers to perform their "diverse and highly technical" duties).
87.
88.

1060

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 111: 1045

the effects of crime and punishment to spill over
interaction, which caused
94
across neighborhoods.

Moreover, each of the larger cities needed-and had-more than a thousand police officers, along with dozens of prosecutors and numerous
judges. 95 To imagine that organizations of this size can be governed by local
political units or managed by memory and personal relationships96 is more
than unrealistic. It was-and would be again-a recipe for disaster.
Although America's pre-1960 criminal justice institutions were gravely
flawed, Stuntz is nonetheless correct about one salient point: levels of crime
and imprisonment were both relatively low. Crime rates did not seem low to
contemporaries, but they were far lower than those we have faced in the
post-1960, post-reform era. 97 And these features alone could conceivably

redeem criminal justice arrangements that were badly dysfunctional in other
respects.
Informal, democratically responsive structures had coincided with relatively low rates of crime, and Professor Stuntz insists that the correlation
between subsequently rising crime rates and the collapse of local democracy
was "more than coincidental" (p. 7). "[A] locally run justice system," where
"residents of poor city neighborhoods" had a greater ability "to govern the
police officers and prosecutors who govern them," resulted in a criminal
justice system that "was more lenient, more egalitarian, and more effective
94. See Bettman, supra note 60, at 155-57 (discussing how geographical division of
authority within law enforcement impedes crime control); see also Parker, supra note 72, at
5-6 (discussing law enforcement problems in light of the "social and economic turmoil" of
large cities).
95. See 1967 CRIME COMM'N, supra note 10, at 106, 113 (noting that in the mid-1960s
large cities averaged 2.3 police officers per thousand residents, i.e. a force of over a thousand
police officers for a city of half a million people, and that New York City at that time had
twenty-eight thousand police officers); Lee Silverstein, Manpower Requirements in the Administration of Criminal Justice, in THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS

152, 156 (1967) (presenting survey

data showing that in the early 1960s, Los Angeles had 178 assistant prosecutors and most
American counties with over a million residents had 30 to 100 assistant prosecutors); cf
Fosdick, supra note 18, at 6 (noting that the Cleveland police force in the 1920s numbered
1,381 officers, including 1,125 patrolmen); Smith & Ehrmann, supra note 27, at 252-53 (noting that Cleveland in the 1920s had a dozen common pleas judges and ten municipal court
judges). Many courts, however, were notoriously short of judges. See 1967 CRIME COMM'N,
supra note 10, at 128 (acknowledging "the gross disparity between the number of cases and
the personnel" in many lower courts and noting that prior to 1967, the District of Columbia
Court of General Sessions had only four judges to process thousands of cases per year).

96. See, e.g., WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON POLICE, supra note 46, at 1-2 (noting
that the administrative structures prevalent in law enforcement would soon lead to bankruptcy
in any corporate business similar in size to an urban police force); Frankfurter, supra note 13,
at vi (noting that by the 1920s, law enforcement methods and machinery that worked well in
early America had turned into "a menace"). See generally supra Sections II.A-C.
For the concern of contemporary observers with regard to crime levels in their own
97.
eras, see supra text accompanying notes 15, 17-20 (Cleveland and other cities in 1920); supra
text accompanying note 48 (America in the late 1920s); and supra text accompanying note 81
(America in the mid-1960s). For data on crime rates in the post-reform era, see infra text accompanying notes 126-128.
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than today's version" (pp. 7, 9). Even if the pre-1960 institutions worked
poorly in many ways, Stuntz still might be right in arguing that our system
became more punitive, more discriminatory, and less effective because of
the post-1960 reforms. If so, he might also be right that we could reverse
these consequences, in part, by restoring the "large dose of local democracy
that once ruled American criminal justice" (p. 8). The next Part examines
this causal claim.
III.

AFTER

1960-DID REFORM

CONTRIBUTE TO

OUR CURRENT PREDICAMENT?

The Collapse targets three distinct post-1960 developments: professionalization of policing and prosecution, steps to strip the substantive law of its
moral blame requirement, and the Warren Court's procedural due process
reforms. Stuntz then links these reforms to sharp jumps in plea bargaining,
crime, imprisonment, and discrimination (p. 7). To clarify this narrative, it
will help first to set aside two of its contentions-that after 1960, reformers
made blame much less prominent and that guilty pleas became much more
prominent.98 Sections III.A and III.B demonstrate that these two factual
claims are at odds with the great weight of the evidence. The rest of Stuntz's
post-1960 picture, however, is descriptively accurate, and he offers a compelling account of its human costs. If the reforms of the 1960s are in part
responsible for this tragedy, as Stuntz insists, the implications are momentous. But as the remaining Sections of this Part show, that claim is difficult
to reconcile with the evidence.
A. De-emphasis of Moral Blame?

As part of his skepticism toward elitist reform, Stuntz argues in The Collapse that "[t]he law professors who wrote the Model Penal Code helped to
replace a system of legal doctrine that worked with one that didn't" (p. 194).
Under pre-reform laws, the book asserts, strict liability was disfavored,
criminal codes left broad scope for open-ended arguments of substantive
innocence, and "[piroof of criminal intent meant proof of moral fault, not
just the intent to carry out one's physical actions" (pp. 140-41, 349 n.29).
Reformers, the book claims, pushed to create many more offenses that were
easily proved and sought to narrow the requirement of blameworthiness, so
that "the concept of wrongful intent ... has gone by the boards."' This alleged change in substantive law then helped to shift influence over
punishment from grassroots preferences to distant legislatures and professional prosecutors. 1°°
98. See pp. 260-64.
99. P. 260 ("The most important change may have come in... the law of mens rea....
Traditionally, that body of law required proof that the defendant acted with a state of mind that
was worthy of moral blame.. .. But for the most part, [that] concept of wrongful intent ...
has gone by the boards.").
100.

See pp. 257-65.
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Many examples can be found to support these generalizations, but on the
whole, the substantive criminal law has moved primarily in the opposite
direction. To be sure, our statutes today include more mala prohibita offenses than in the past: regulatory laws against behavior that is not inherently
immoral have proliferated. But this development reflects the greater
complexity of our economy and the greater speed and power of industrial
processes. It also reflects our better understanding of the health and safety
implications of unregulated conduct."l ' It is an inherent consequence
of mo10 2
demity, not primarily a policy choice that could have been avoided.
In any case, there can be no doubt about the work of "[tlhe law professors who wrote the Model Penal Code" (p. 194). The Code launched "a
frontal attack on absolute or strict liability"103 and replaced loose concepts
like "general intent"-often read to require no moral blame-with carefully
defined mental elements.1°4 It also created a robust presumption that we
must, if possible, interpret penal statutes to require a mental state with
clear-cut moral content-at a minimum a "conscious[] disregard[] [of] a
substantial and unjustified risk [of harm] .... involv[ing] a gross deviation

from the standard of conduct [of] a law-abiding person." 105
Supreme Court jurisprudence has likewise moved toward stronger culpability requirements. At the turn of the twentieth century and for several
decades thereafter, strict liability was the prevailing interpretive presumption, especially for new regulatory statutes; 0 6 more recently, the Court has
generally insisted on interpreting federal felony statutes to require awareness of wrongdoing. 10 7 And for homicide cases, where Stuntz argues that
jury culpability judgments were a crucial path to leniency before 1960, the

101. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Future of the Adversary System, 3 JUST. Q. 83, 8384 (1986) (arguing that technological advances that increase the risk of "individual or social
injury" necessitate regulation).
102. To be sure, regulatory prohibitions need not be enforced by the criminal law, and
one can argue that penal sanctions normally should be reserved for conduct that is mala in se.
But this does not appear to be the objection asserted in The Collapse, and it raises many
broader complications. Suffice it to say that there appears to be no moral reason why criminal
sanctions should not attach to the knowing violation of mala prohibitarules.
103. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cmt. 1(1985).

104.

Id. § 2.02 cmt. 1.

105. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), (3) (1962).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). Stuntz claims that strict liability was uncommon in the earlier era
and presents Balint as the exception that proves the rule. See p. 349 n.29. But he offers no
examples of cases that represent what he considers to be the prevailing view. The evidence
suggests, to the contrary, that Balint was not an exception but rather was typical for its day.
See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254-58 (1952) (discussing strict liability as the

prevailing view for "public welfare" offenses).
107. E.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994); Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); Morissette, 342
U.S. 246.
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open-ended mens rea assessments that substantive law traditionally required
remain in place with no significant change. 8
The charge that reformers sought to multiply the prosecutorial arsenal of
easily proved crimes (p. 263) likewise can be supported by some examples,
but again, much of the evidence is to the contrary. From the early 1900s
through the 1950s, the substantive law punished a staggering variety of
moralistic offenses. The elite reformers led the charge against it. An analysis
in the 1920s lamented that in a typical city, "police were expected to be familiar with and enforce 30,000 [f]ederal, [s]tate, or local enactments!"1
Later academics criticized the same evil, 10 and in the 1950s, the Model Penal Code-well ahead of its time-eliminated criminal punishment for
sodomy, adultery, fornication, and consensual same-sex adult relationships.' Whatever other criticisms one might level at the professionals who
pushed for reform after 1960, neglect of substantive culpability is not one of
them.
B. A Surge in the Guilty Plea Rate?

It is easy to see how an observer might believe that guilty pleas have
soared since the 1960s. Statistics prior to that period were not compiled systematically, and some of the available data show plea rates lower than
today's. Thus, The Collapse contrasts 1962 data showing that "roughly twothirds" of felony convictions were obtained by guilty plea to 2006 data
putting that rate at 96 percent.1 12 A surge of this magnitude, if well substantiated, would indeed be a dramatic and worrisome development.
Such contrasts can be flawed, however, when they aggregate plea rates
across jurisdictions, especially when, as in The Collapse, the studies compare different sorts of jurisdictions. The Collapse juxtaposes the 1962
average for twenty-eight mainly nonurban counties with the 2006 average
in America's seventy-five largest counties-not a safe basis for establishing a trend. Indeed, in the same 1962 study that Stuntz cites for evidence
of low plea rates in that year, a broader data base, covering all fifty states
and the District of Columbia, showed that guilty pleas in 1962 accounted
for 67% of all dispositions-including dismissals and acquittals. After
108. If anything, the law has broadened the avenues for mitigation and acquittal through
the more flexible treatment of battered spouse syndrome ("BSS") that emerged in the early
1980s, see, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984), and the now-prevalent legislative
mandate to admit BSS testimony as evidence of self-defense, see SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL.,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 844 (9th ed. 2012).
109. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 84, at 77 (referring to a
study of the 1914-1929 period).
110. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization,374 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157 (1967).
111. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 207.1, 207.5, at 205-10, 277-79 (Tentative Draft 1955);
Louis B. Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 67374 (1963).

112.

Pp. 32, 326 n.56 (citing

CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS

LEE SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL

93 (1965)).
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excluding the dispositions by dismissal and acquittal, the 1962 guilty-plea
rate-as a percentage of convictions-was 85% or more in thirty-seven
states and was at least 90% in twenty-four states,1 13 not much less than the
96% rate we see in urban jurisdictions more than forty years later.114
Observers have mourned "the vanishing jury" for almost a century.
Raymond Moley gave that title to an article he published in 1928 after encountering plea rates of at least 75% in eighteen of the twenty-four cities he
surveyed and rates at the 90% level in five of them.II 5 In Cleveland, the felony guilty-plea rate had reached 77% as early as 1 9 2 0 .116 By the 1950s, one
study found that guilty pleas nationwide accounted for "roughly 90[%] of
all criminal convictions."1' 17 And the president's 1967 Crime Commission,
reporting 1964 data, put the nationwide guilty plea rate at 87% of convictions.118 The evidence, therefore, does not support The Collapse's claim that

guilty pleas accounted for only two-thirds of convictions in the early 1960s
or that such pleas have surged dramatically since. At most, any increase
seems to be on the order of a 5% shift (roughly from 90% to 95%) over this
fifty-year period.

It must be stressed, moreover, that any increase since 1960 cannot in any
event be considered a distinctive, post-1960 development. Guilty plea rates
19
have been rising, more or less steadily, since the Civil War or earlier, an
113. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 112, at 92-93 tbl.27. The report does not indicate the
proportion of trial adjudications ending in conviction. But if we assume that roughly twothirds of trials end in conviction, the guilty plea rate as a percentage of convictions for each
state can be estimated by dividing the portion of the total caseload estimated to end in conviction (the sum of the guilty plea percentage plus two-thirds of the trial percentage) into the
guilty plea percentage. This procedure yields an estimated guilty plea rate of 80 percent or
more for forty-three of the fifty-one jurisdictions, 85 percent or more for thirty-seven, 90 percent or more for twenty-four, and 95 percent or more for twelve.
114. P. 139. The Collapse further supports its claim of plummeting trial rates by contrasting the same 96 percent rate for 2006 to a 63 percent rate for 1880-1910 in Alameda
County, California. P. 139. But since that county's population averaged only 155,000 during
those years, see LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE 21

tbl.2.1 (1981), this jurisdiction also affords an unsatisfactory point of comparison to the largest
counties today.

116.

See Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 105 (1928).
See supra text accompanying note 41.

117.

DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE

115.

WITHOUT TRIAL 8 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1966) (reporting American Bar Foundation field
surveys conducted 1956-1957); id. at 45 (stating that up to 90 percent of defendants in federal
courts plead guilty).
118.

TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 95, at 9 (discussing other estimates

that "guilty pleas account for 90 percent of all convictions; and perhaps as high as 95 percent
of misdemeanor convictions" (footnote omitted)).
119. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH 8 (2003) ("[P]lea bargaining in
New York [State] began its long rise in the first half of the nineteenth century and ... reached
near-modern proportions by [the nineteenth] century's end); id. at 12, 113, 291 n.8 (reporting
that in Massachusetts, plea bargaining began to rise before 1810 and reached 87% of adjudications, and thus presumably about 90% of convictions, by 1900); Moley, supra note 115, at 108
(reporting that in rural and urban counties of New York State, guilty pleas grew from 15-35%
of convictions in 1839 to 90% of convictions in 1926).
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evolution that is best understood as reflecting personal and institutional incentives which are well entrenched and independent of particular doctrinal
arguments available to prosecutors and defendants. 120 In short, the evidence
does not support Stuntz's claim that increases since 1960-if any-have
been a departure from the trend. There is no reason to suspect that a causally
significant new event had occurred.
C. Where ConditionsDid Deteriorate,Was Reform PartlyResponsible?
The most striking argument of The Collapse is Stuntz's claim of a link
between diminished local control and judicial reform of procedure on the
one hand, and soaring rates of crime, imprisonment, and discrimination on
the other. Although The Collapse allows that the two sets of developments
might be merely coincidental (p. 7), Stuntz's overall insistence on a causal
connection is unmistakable. 2' And the policy preferences that drive Stuntz's
narrative-his call to resist professionalization, roll back Warren Court procedural reforms, and allow local neighborhoods to "exercise more power... as
they once did" (p. 283)-rely on that causal premise.
Stuntz does not claim that crime rose because Warren Court decisions
22
handcuffed the police or otherwise undermined deterrence. But he insists
on linking the rise in crime to diminishing local control. Once crime rose,
increases in harsh, discriminatory punishment were possibly inevitable, but,
Stuntz argues, Warren Court efforts to protect minorities aggravated that
trend. If sound, this analysis requires a radical change in strategy for anyone
seeking to mitigate unfairness in criminal justice. Yet these causal claimsthat diminishing local control contributed to rising crime and that Warren
Court reforms contributed to harshness and discrimination-are dubious.
Although one set of events did follow the other, far too much of the evidence is irreconcilable with the claim of a causal link. This Section
considers first, the supposed impact on crime; second, the supposed harm to
the indigent; and third, the supposed contribution to the surge in imprisonment and discrimination.

120. See FISHER, supra note 119, at 161-204 for thorough documentation of this point.
That said, there is little doubt that the Supreme Court's tolerance, or encouragement, of plea
bargaining and refusal to place significant impediments in its path, notably in Bordenkircherv.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), helped ensure that this evolution would continue uninterrupted.
In The Collapse, Stuntz brilliantly dissects Bordenkircher and presents a powerful critique of
its holding. Pp. 257-59.
See, e.g., pp. 26, 29 ("[A]t least three causes seem to have contributed.... The third
121.
explanation [centralization of political power] may be the most important."); pp. 35-36
("What political dynamic could produce such ... outcomes?... The core reason is [weakening of local democracy]."); p. 216 ("Earl Warren ... helped usher in the harsh politics of crime
.... [These were] unintended consequences .... "); p. 218 ("Because [the Warren Court
granted defense counsel more legal claims], poorer [defendants] grew more disadvantaged.").
122. That once-common claim is now discredited. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's PracticalEffect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U.
L. REV. 500 (1996).
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1. Did Reform Aggravate the Surge in Crime?
The Collapse acknowledges that rising crime had complex causes (p.
26). To help unpack them, it presents a striking comparison between two
great migrations to the cities of the North: European immigrants before
1920, and African Americans who moved from the rural South just before
and after World War II. In both cases, the influx and resulting social instability could be expected to cause-and did cause-a surge in crime. But "the
first [crime wave] was short-lived and mild, the second long-lasting and severe" (p. 17). Why did the second migration lead to much more crime?
Although The Collapse recognizes that no single factor produced this
difference, it focuses particular attention on "three causes [that] seem to
have contributed" (pp. 26-29)-the state of the economy, leniency in
punishment, and the waning of local democratic control. The economic
explanation is unsatisfying, The Collapse argues, because fluctuations in
crime show little relation to fluctuations in national economic prosperity
(pp. 26-28). Fluctuations in crime also fit poorly with fluctuations in imprisonment rates (p. 28), prompting Stuntz to conclude that something else
must have been at work.
That leaves only the third possibility-the decline of local democracyand Stuntz argues that this explanation "may be the most important" (p. 29).
To fill out that argument, he draws attention to empirical research documenting that people are more likely to obey the law when they view the justice
system as legitimate:
[T]hese two very different crime waves are [therefore] less puzzling than
first appears. By the late nineteenth century-when crime in immigrantdominated cities was mostly falling, not rising-working-class immigrants
and their offspring largely governed the justice system that governed them.
Even today, African Americans have no such power. (pp. 29-30)

That difference was important because, Stuntz argues, when local communities lost power over prosecution and punishment, the perceived
legitimacy of the justice system eroded. No longer could crime be "controlled through local democracy and the network of relationships that
supported it" (p. 31). In the earlier period, "[c]ops, crime victims, criminals,
and the jurors who judged them ... were not wholly distinct communi-

ties.... Rage at the depredations of criminals was tempered by empathy for
defendants charged with crime" (p. 31). The waning of local democracy
ended that tempering process. Crime surged because potential criminals,
having lost respect for the system, were more willing to offend, and punishment surged because local democracy was no longer empowered to hold
it back (p. 31).
Although this hypothesis could conceivably explain some of the crime
increase after 1960, there are reasons to doubt whether it was significantand especially whether, as The Collapse implies, it was so significant that it
overshadows everything else worth mentioning. One reason for this doubt is
that Stuntz's argument for declining "legitimacy" uses that concept loosely,
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largely equating it with features he wants to restore-jury trials and local
political control of police and prosecutors. But the research connecting
legitimacy to compliance with law lacks that focus and does not test those
variables. Rather, it finds that the crucial factor shaping perceived legitimacy
is "procedural justice," conceptualized in terms of citizen beliefs that police
and other officials know the law and apply it fairly (pp. 83-84). Procedural
justice encompasses such matters as whether officials give individuals an
opportunity to be heard before taking action, give reasons for their decisions, and treat individuals with respect. 123 And crucially, the research finds
obey the law strongly
that perceptions of whether police officers themselves
2 4
shape citizen perceptions of procedural justice.1
This research therefore suggests that the Warren Court reforms that The
Collapse proposes to roll back-in particular, Miranda, which requires the
police interrogators to warn suspects of their rights and honor their requests
to remain silent, and Mapp, which is designed to prevent police and prosecitizen
cutors from profiting from Fourth Amendment wrongs'121--enhance
compliance with the law, rather than weaken it. To be sure, the voice of local
politics might be another part of the procedural-justice equation. But given
the way local politics operated on the ground prior to the 1960s, 126 we can
hardly assume that potential offenders in earlier periods-especially young
male migrants-were treated with more dignity or felt more empowered to
influence their local police and prosecutors.
One way to tease out the impact of local politics is to shift the framework of comparison. In juxtaposing two periods of migration--one that
arguably allowed migrants a political voice and another that did not-The
Collapse compares two eras half a century apart, with enormous differences
other than just their approaches to politics. A better procedure to assess
whether migrants' access to political power affected crime rates would be to
compare simultaneous crime trends in jurisdictions differing in their experiences of migration. For example, we could take 1950-1980 crime trends in
the Northeast and compare them with crime trends during the same time in
other parts of the country. Of course, the regions still differ in many
123. See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 96-97, 129 (1990) (judgments
about procedural justice (and hence legitimacy) depend on police impartiality and whether an

officer considers the citizen's views before acting); Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American
Policing at a Crossroads:Unsustainable Policies and the ProceduralJustice Alternative, 101
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 346 (2011) (perceptions of procedural justice are shaped by
whether police are consistent and courteous, and whether they give people they encounter an
opportunity to be heard); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of ProceduralJustice and
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & Soc'x REV. 513, 519, 542,
546-47 (2003) (assessing judgments of procedural justice based on whether police treat people fairly, equally, and with dignity).
124. See Schulhofer et al., supra note 123, at 358, 363 (police disregard for law undermines perceived legitimacy); Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 123, at 542, 546 (judgments of
procedural justice significantly shaped by whether police understand the law and make decisions based on facts).
125. See Schulbofer et al., supra note 123, at 358, 362-63.

126.

See id. at 338-39.
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respects, but confounding social and economic factors will be far less dramatic if we compare jurisdictions that are contemporary in time.
Figure 1 takes this approach and compares 1950-1980 crime trends in
the Northeast to crime trends over the same period in the South and West. In
the latter regions, crime-rate increases in the 1950s were actually more dramatic than in the Northeast. After 1966 they track the Northeastern pattern
127
almost exactly.

This regional comparison may, however, be insufficiently sensitive, because some cities in the South and West also experienced significant
population shifts. The African American population of Atlanta, for example,
grew from 38% in 1960 to 51% in 1970 and to 67% in 1980.121 If Atlanta
was experiencing a surge in crime similar to that occurring in the Northeast,
the explanation could simply be that it was also experiencing a surge in migration similar to that occurring in the Northeast.
A more fine-grained test of the migration thesis of The Collapse therefore must focus on cities that did not experience a substantial influx of
African Americans or other minorities during the period. Figure 2 permits
that assessment by comparing the Northeast to cities where the minority
population was stable or even declining-Birmingham, Charlotte, Jacksonville, and Memphis. 129 As Figure 2 shows, the crime-rate patterns in these

cities where there was no significant influx of minorities look virtually identical to the crime-rate patterns we see in the migration-impacted
Northeastern cities featured in The Collapse. And of course the African
127. See infra Figure 1. The volatility of crime rates in the South and West is probably
attributable in part to the fact that cities in those regions were on the whole much smaller than
those of the Northeast, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. Because small cities have relatively few non-negligent homicides, random variation in the absolute number of such killings
annually has a large impact on the percentage change. For example, Jackson, Mississippi had
three murders and non-negligent manslaughters in 1951, 22 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES

95 (1951), eighteen in 1952 (a 500 percent in-

crease), 23 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR
(1952), and eight in 1953 (a 56 percent decrease), 24 U.S. DEP'T OF
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES

THE UNITED STATES

101

JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME

98 (1953). The graph's three-year moving average tempers

such fluctuations but cannot eliminate all of them. See infra Figure 1.
128. Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, HistoricalCensus Statistics on PopulationTotals by
Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other Urban
Places in the United States 2 tbl. 11(U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Working Paper
No. 76, 2005). For convenience, comprehensive data on minority population for the major
U.S. cities are on file with the Michigan Law Review and available in an Appendix published
with the online version of this Article. For the Atlanta data cited above, see Appendix tbl. 1.
129. See infra Figure 2. The African American share of the population for each of the
decennial years from 1950-1980 was: Birmingham, 40%, 40%, 42%, 56%; Charlotte, 28%,
28%, 30%, 31%; Jacksonville, 35%, 41%, 22%, 25%; and Memphis, 37%, 37%, 39%, 48%.
See Appendix, supra note 128, tbl. 1. Jackson, Mississippi, which also had a stable black population during this period, is excluded from Figure 2 because its low absolute number of
homicides produces great volatility in homicide-rate changes. See supra note 127. Allowing
for that volatility, comparisons including Jackson are largely identical to those illustrated by
Figure 2. Space limitations prevent publication of additional graphs here, but to ensure against
cherry-picking of the data, graphs depicting the cities individually and in other combinations
are available in the online Appendix to this Article.

CriminalJustice, Local Democracy

April 2013]

1069

American communities of these Southern cities faced none of the decline in
political power that police professionalism brought to the North in the period prior to 1950; in the 1950s, as in the 1920s, these African American
130
communities in the South had no appreciable political power to lose.
FIGURE

1

HOMICIDE RATES
PERCENT CHANGE OVER PRIOR YEAR (THREE-YEAR MOVING AVERAGE)
NORTHERN VS. SOUTHERN
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Cities: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, New
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A
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•10.0%

-15.0%
Source. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES
(1947-1982). Each annual data point represents the percentage change over the prior
year for the specified year, averaged with the percentage change for the years
immediately preceding and following the specified year.

130. In its discussion of Southern justice, The Collapse provides compelling illustrations
of this point. E.g., pp. 145-47.
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2

HOMICIDE RATES
PERCENT CHANGE OVER PRIOR YEAR (THREE-YEAR MOVING AVERAGE)
NORTHERN CITIES VS. BIRMINGHAM, CHARLOTTE, JACKSONVILLE, MEMPHIS
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Source:. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES

(1947-1982). Each annual data point represents the percentage change over the prior
year for the specified year, averaged with the percentage change for the years
immediately preceding and following the specified year.

It is therefore difficult to attribute so much importance to possible contrasts in the political power of different migrant groups. It seems far more
likely that new developments, operating nationally in the 1960s but not earlier, account for the late-twentieth-century surge in crime. And in fact,
powerful developments not present earlier in the century struck the nation
with great force after 1960. Extraordinary demographic change abruptly and
dramatically destabilized law enforcement and inner-city social structure;
there were diminishing needs for unskilled labor, as well as unprecedented
mobility, an equally unprecedented concentration of poverty, and the weakening of traditional family arrangements. Each of these changes represents a
substantial story in itself, but a brief account is essential if we are to understand the low-crime, low-punishment world that preceded the 1960s-and
why it disappeared so suddenly.
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Consider the demographic changes.' 3 ' During the attractive low-crime,
low-punishment era of the 1940s and 1950s, young males, the most crimeprone segment of the population, were an unusually small cohort, a result of
exceptionally low birth rates during the Depression and World War II. When
the economy rebounded and millions of veterans returned home after many
lonely years overseas, it was not hard to foresee a baby boom. It was likewise not hard to foresee that, fifteen years later, the nation would experience
a boom in its population of crime-prone teenagers. Indeed, the country faced
an onslaught, with the high-crime age brackets swelling by 1.3 million
young people each year during the 1960s; the increase during those ten
years "was greater than the growth in [that] segment of the population for
the rest of the century put together."' 3 2 The surge in crime was predictable
133
and predicted.
One puzzle is that the age shift after 1960 does not account for all of the
rise in crime.13 1 If the waning of local political control did not play a role in
pushing crime rates higher, why did public safety deteriorate more drastically than demographers expected? James Q. Wilson suggests, tentatively but
persuasively, that the explanation involves "critical mass": the number of
young people, and thus the number of offenders, grew so fast that social
institutions were overwhelmed.' 35 "[W]hen an increase in that mass [of
young persons] is sudden and large, a self-sustaining chain reaction is set off
that creates an explosive increase in the amount of crime, addiction, and
welfare dependency.... The institutional mechanisms which could handle
problems in ordinary numbers were suddenly swamped ... "'I36 By the end
of the 1960s, narcotics-related deaths in New York City had increased
twelvefold, and heroin usage in Atlanta and Boston was ten times higher
than it had been before 1963.131
1 38
Another crucial factor was the decreasing demand for unskilled labor.
Although the economy was thriving in the 1960s, African Americans were
poorly placed to benefit. 139 Compared to European immigrants of the earlier
era, African Americans in the 1960s faced not only more intense discrimination but also a job market increasingly unreceptive to untrained,
undereducated workers. 140 The inner-city poor of the two periods therefore
differed considerably in their access to economic opportunity.
The Collapse mentions that the Baby Boom of the late 1940s contributed to the
131.
crime surge of the 1960s but does not pursue this point or consider it as a possible reason for
the contrasting patterns of crime during the two migrations. P 20.
132. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 20 (rev. ed. 1983).
133. See 1967 CRIME COMM'N, supra note 10, at v-vi.
134.

JAMES Q. WILSON, supra note 132, at 23-25.

135.
136.

See id. at 24-25.

137.
138.

See id. at 16-17.

139.

Id.

140.

Id. at 141-42.

Id.
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 41

(2d ed. 2012).
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Other forces were also likely at work. One simple but crucial development was cars-more of them to steal, to transport drugs, to support
predatory crime in distant neighborhoods and to enable quick getaways. In
1910, near the end of the European migration, there were only 5 motor vehicles for every 1,000 U.S. residents; in 1920, when unrestricted European
immigration ended, there were still only 76 per 1,000.141 Even in 1950,
when motorized patrol was widespread for the police, the public at large had
only 266 vehicles per 1,000.142 Yet, by the end of the 1970s, the 1950 figure
had doubled to nearly 527 per 1,000.143 It would be too simple to suggest
that this factor alone made crime control twice as difficult, but its importance is not difficult to see.
Another powerful influence was the precipitous deterioration of the social structure of inner-city neighborhoods. Starting in the 1960s, highway
construction, prosperity, and more cars opened the suburbs to middle-class
and lower-middle-class city dwellers. They moved en masse, leaving a sudden and unprecedented concentration of the poor in the inner cities.'" The
impact on predominantly African American neighborhoods was especially
strong because antidiscrimination policies were rapidly reducing barriers to
residential mobility and prompting "a steady out-migration of middle- and
working-class [black] families. '145 The contrast to the low-crime, lowpunishment eras before 1960 had important consequences. During the 1920s
and even the 1950s, black communities had "featured a vertical integration
of... [1]ower-class, working-class, and middle-class black families .... "146
In the 1960s, this economic integration quickly began to disappear, producing what William' 47Julius Wilson has called "concentration effects" and
"social isolation."' Inner cities in the late 1960s, unlike their predecessors,
lacked the "social buffer" that tempered the impact of joblessness, provided
"mainstream role models," and sustained norms of hard work and law48
abiding behavior.
Changes in family structure were also devastating. Single-parent, female-headed households are especially vulnerable to poverty, an important
risk factor for crime. 4 9 Fortunately, "In the early twentieth century the vast
majority of both black and white low-income families were intact."'150 But
later, as plummeting demand for unskilled labor drove up joblessness
among African American males (from 20% in 1930 to 44% in 1983), the
141. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
tbl.HS-41 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/statab/hist/HS-41 .pdf.
142.

Id.

143.
144.

WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON,

145.
146.

Id. at 56.
Id. at 7.

147.

Id. at 58, 61.

148.
149.
150.

Id. at 56.
Id. at 26-29, 71.
Id. at 63.

Id.
supra note 138, at 54-55.

STATES

77-78
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number of African American men able to support a family tumbled, and the
number of single-mother households soared-from 18% of African American families in 1940 to more than double that figure-42%-in 1983.51
In short, staggering socioeconomic change struck American cities after
1960. It happened in a breathtakingly short period. And the new conditions
were powerfully criminogenic: a skyrocketing youth population; sharply
rising rates of drug abuse and addiction; plunging demand for unskilled labor; greater physical and social mobility; the erosion of economic-class
integration in neighborhoods; the concentration of poverty; weakening of
the family structure; and the disappearance of mainstream role models for
young people. With so much dramatic change affecting the inner-city social
structure so rapidly, there is little reason to single out the waning of neighborhood political power as a major causal factor in the rise of crime. The
same social forces were at work nationally, and indeed internationally, with
the same effects-whether or not a jurisdiction experienced a decline in localized control of law enforcement: "[T]he two decades after 1960 ....
coincided, more or less exactly, with a rapid and sustained increase in recjust in the USA and the UK, but in every Western
orded crime rates-not
15 2
industrialized nation."'
This background also casts light on the broader themes of The Collapse.
Whatever may be the attraction of localized democracy under the social
conditions of 1920 or 1950, we cannot assume that such politics would work
equally well in the 1970s or today. And a city's ability, before 1960, to control crime through informal institutions without harsh punishment tells us
very little about the capacity of such institutions to succeed under the conditions that took hold so quickly thereafter.
2. Did Reform Undermine Defense of the Poor and the Innocent?
The Collapse also insists that, as a result of elite reforms, the justice system became less'fair to suspects who are indigent or wrongly accused. In a
book filled with counterintuitive claims, this is one of the most surprising.
But Stuntz rests his argument on straightforward economic logic. In a chapter entitled "Earl Warren's Errors" (Chapter Eight), Stuntz contends that
because new procedural rights made prosecutions harder to win, states compensated by withholding funds for indigent defense and by ramping up
punishment-in part to induce guilty pleas more easily. To make matters
worse, Stuntz argues, the new procedural rights fail to focus on factual guilt
and are relatively inexpensive to litigate. Thus, in a world of limited
resources, attorneys will "inevitably" allocate more time to procedural
151.

Id. at 65, 82.

152.

DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CON-

90 (2001). In a later chapter, The Collapse mentions briefly that "[l]arge
social, political, and economic forces lay behind the riots and rising crime that were concentrated in urban black neighborhoods [after the 1950s]*" P. 241. But the book does not bring
this point to bear on its discussion of possible reasons for contrasting experiences of crime
during the two migrations.
TEMPORARY SOCIETY
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defenses, leaving less time for asserting the defendant's innocence (p. 58).
The new rights benefit guilty defendants and wealthy defendants, who can
afford attorneys to invoke them, leaving the poor and the innocent more disadvantaged than before.
An initial weakness of this causal story, ironically, is its originalitynonnally a strength in academic work. But in this instance, the causal
argument requires us to believe that for more than forty years, practitioners
working daily to promote fairness for minorities and the poor have failed to
notice that decisions like Mapp and Miranda had deeply damaged their
cause.153 The civil liberties community, of course, is often divided in its
views about constitutional issues. But there is no evidence of significant
sentiment in that community for overturning Mapp and Miranda as a means
to help their clientele or to gain traction in the political process. Of course,
people on the front lines could be wrong. But Stuntz's argument is rooted in
claims about how legal change plays out in the real world. If several generations of civil liberties practitioners have misunderstood those interactions
and failed to see where the interests of those they care about really lie, we
are witness to false consciousness on a very wide scale. We cannot rule out
that possibility, but we have reason to approach the causal hypothesis with
skepticism.
More concretely, the logic of Stuntz's argument has large flaws. As an
initial matter, the claim that the focus of Warren Court procedural reforms
was "not on the accuracy of the defendant's conviction" (p. 230) seems considerably exaggerated, especially when The Collapse asserts that the rights
to counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and discovery of exculpatory
evidence are not primarily concerned with factual guilt (pp. 227, 229-30).
The book does not say nearly enough to defend this view; the reliability of
evidence and the accuracy of adjudication are precisely the point of these
particular safeguards. 5 4 With respect to the book's primary targets, Mapp
and Miranda, the unrelated-to-innocence claim is largely accurate.' 55 Even
153. See cases cited supra notes 4-5.
154. The Collapse argues that subjecting lab technicians to cross-examination makes the
use of forensic evidence more costly and, thus, inevitably means less reliance on such evidence, despite its "increasing ...accuracy." P. 227. More explanation is needed to justify the
implicit assumptions here-that inability to cross-examine technicians will not affect the accuracy of their reports, and that states, in order to preserve their ability to introduce such
evidence, will not allocate additional funds. On counsel, The Collapse argues that although
"[t]rials with effective defense counsel are more likely to [be] accurate," p. 229, enforcement
of that right does not merely identify innocent defendants but "[i]nstead .. . protect[s] all
defendants harmed by [procedural error]. At best, appellate review of this sort gets at accuracy
indirectly. Better simply to ask whether the government proved its case..... P.230. But asking "whether the government proved its case," p. 230, cannot suffice when ineffective
assistance leaves the appellate court with a record that inadequately presents the defendant's
side of the story. Without radical change in our methods of appellate review, appellate courts
cannot assess innocence directly; they can get at that issue only by assessing the integrity of
the procedures followed by the trier of fact.
155. Even these decisions often serve substantive innocence because defense attorneys
use them for substantive purposes. Since discovery rights are limited, motions to suppress may
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so, the argument that these decisions inevitably diverted resources from
claims of innocence is weaker than it seems.
First, why posit that defense resources are fixed? Since procedural reform created new issues, private counsel can now raise additional
arguments, and expectations of effective assistance shift accordingly. Legislatures allocating money for indigent defense no doubt respond grudgingly
15 6
to this new norm, and funding has always been shamefully inadequate.
But there is no reason to assume that legislatures allocated no additional
funds-or so little that attorneys were forced to forego promising claims of
innocence. The facts on the ground confirm this intuition, and not just in the
South. On the eve of Gideon,'57 the Philadelphia public defender had a staff
of only 6 attorneys.' 58 Four years later it had 36 attorneys, 10 investigators,
and a social worker; by 1984, the office employed more than seventeen
times its pre-Gideon contingent-104 attorneys, 12 paralegals, 24 investigators, and 14 social workers. 15 9 The caseload had grown too, but not by that
0
much! 16
Second, even when resources are fixed and procedural claims are inex-

pensive to litigate, Stuntz's economic logic fails because it considers only
litigation costs, ignoring benefits. Successful suppression motions do not
inevitably require dismissal, and a prosecutor convinced of a defendant's
guilt will presumably seek some other basis for conviction; a claim of factual innocence, in contrast, means unequivocal victory when it succeeds. And
again, the facts bear out this intuition. Motions to suppress rarely affect the
disposition of criminal cases; 16 1 now as before, the overwhelming majority
of criminal cases are litigated over issues of factual guilt.'

2

provide a defense attorney's only opportunity to preview the prosecutor's case and pin down
witness testimony; such motions thus become a crucial predicate for preparing substantive
defenses. I am grateful to Erin Murphy for calling my attention to this point.
156. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargainingas Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1999
(1992).
157. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
158.
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1037,
1098 n.200 (1984).
159. Id. at 1053, 1098 n.200.
160. Philadelphia case filings were only slightly greater in 1984 than in 1967. Id. at 1098
n.200. The Collapse supports its thesis of declining indigent-defense resources by estimating
that, nationally, funding per case fell by 50 percent between 1979 and 1990. P. 256. But this
comparison of 1979 to 1990 sets aside the huge growth of indigent-defense spending in immediate response to Warren Court initiatives, as illustrated by Philadelphia.
161. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984) (stating that Fourth Amendment violations lead to case attrition in 0.6% to 2.35% of felony arrests; in felony drug cases,
case attrition due to the exclusionary rule is "in the range of 2.8% to 7.1 %"). The high-end
estimate is that Mirandaviolations account for the loss of conviction in 3.8% of serious criminal cases, but closer analysis puts that figure at only 0.78%. Schulhofer, supra note 122, at
501-02. Data on unsuccessful motions are not readily available, but prospects for success
presumably guide judgments about where to focus defense effort.
162. The Collapse insists that procedural rights "have led to massive amounts of litigation" P. 226. While this assessment may be accurate in terms of the cases represented on the
Supreme Court docket, it does not seem apt for the million or so felony charges filed each
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In sum, the charge that Warren-era reforms tilted criminal justice efforts
away from determinations of factual guilt is unconvincing. Both economic
logic and the facts on the ground largely point in the opposite direction.
3. Did Reform Aggravate the Surge in Harsh Punishment?
On the issue of punishment severity, the story of reform gone awry again

fails to fit the facts. Consider the chronology: The Warren Court revolution
was waning by 1968, and Warren left the Court in 1969. One might argue
that the Warren era continued at least until the Court's 1972 decision striking down the death penalty. 163 But the forward march of reform had
certainly come to a halt by the mid- 1970s. 16 And by that time, the volume
of crime had soared (Chapter Nine; p. 247, tbls. 9 and 10). Even with punishment policy unchanged, more crime and more prosecutions mean more
imprisonment. The development that is crucial for the Stuntz thesis-the
ramping up of punishment severity per case-did not begin in earnest until
ten to twenty years later. 165 If this was a compensatory response to the due
process reforms of the Warren era, it was surprisingly slow to materialize.
Federal mandatory minimum sentences ("mandatories") feature prominently in Stuntz's account of legislative reaction to judicial activism, but
again the chronology fits poorly with the causal sequence posited in The
Collapse. Congress first enacted federal drug mandatories in 1956,166 at a

year, 90-99 percent of which do not involve motions to suppress that affect the disposition of
the case. See supra note 161. To show that defense investigation of factual defenses has become infrequent, The Collapse cites a study of defense performance in the 1980s but provides
no comparable data suggesting that the allocation of defense effort was different in any earlier
period. P. 228.
163. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
164. The Collapse argues that "[tihe criminal procedure revolution is not in retreat. More
than forty years after Earl Warren retired, it is still advancing." P. 302. This is not plausible.
The only examples the book offers are the Court's recent enlargement of confrontation and
jury trial rights. P. 302. But these decisions only affect the small minority of cases that go to
trial, and in any event they are outweighed by decisions (far too numerous to cite) that began,
as early as 1975, to cut back on the Mapp and Mirandadecisions emphasized in The Collapse.
See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. 897; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see also STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN
EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 66-69 (2012) (describing
the Court's increasing resistance to excluding fruits of an illegal search); id. at 61-65, 83-92,
99-114, 122-26, 126-43 (describing the erosion of Fourth Amendment protections against
warrantless arrest, stop and frisk, "administrative" searches, surveillance by means of enhanced technology, and government access to information shared confidentially with third
parties).
165. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 199, 201 (1993). Somewhat earlier, in 1973, New York State enacted severe mandatory
minimum sentences for certain drug offenses. Id. at 207. That law was a response to New
York's drug problem, not a broad effort to facilitate prosecution or plea bargaining for violent
crimes generally; indeed, that legislation sought to limit plea bargaining. Id.
166. Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. 84-728, 70 Stat. 567 (1956) (repealed 1970);
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENAL-
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time when Supreme Court jurisprudence gave a wide berth to search,
seizure, and police interrogation. 167 Then in 1970, at the height of the Nixon-led law-and-order backlash, Congress repealed nearly all the federal
drug mandatories. 16' Fourteen years later, after the Supreme Court had reinstated the death penalty and relaxed constraints on searches and

interrogation, Congress restored those mandatories. They were then reinforced in 1986 and 1988, times when no new procedural rights had been
announced but just prior to congressional elections. 169

Stuntz might argue that initial legislative reactions were overly crude
(like the effort to overrule Miranda)170 and that politicians needed more time
to find better ways to fight back. Yet the chronology cuts against this

hypothesis as well because procedural reform did not simply halt in the
mid-1970s; it moved into reverse, and by the mid-1980s, due process rights

stood far below their Warren Court high-water mark. Legislatures enacted
harsher sentencing policies at a time when decisions like Mapp, Miranda,
and other procedural landmarks had been largely or entirely de-fanged. It is
difficult to see the surge in America's punitive policies in the 1980s and

1990s as a compensatory response to new due process constraints that no
longer constrained. Other developments at that time are implicated far more
directly: disillusionment with rehabilitation and the parole system that

spread across the ideological spectrum in the late 1970s, the crack epidemic
in the 1980s, and media attention to sensational crimes by repeat offenders
in the 1990s.71
(1991) (mandatory minimums first
imposed in Narcotic Control Act of 1956).
167. The Court imposed an exclusionary rule in federal prosecutions in 1914, Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), but that rule remained inapplicable to the states throughout the 1950s, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26 (1949). The substantive Fourth
Amendment in federal prosecutions was also far more flexible than it became in the 1960s.
Compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1950) (permitting broad power of
search incident to arrest), with Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (overruling
Rabinowitz); compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not restrict wiretapping), with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
352-53 (1967) (overruling Olmstead). With respect to police interrogation, see Cicenia v.
LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 509-10 (1958) (upholding admissibility of confession obtained by interrogation after denying express request to consult attorney); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S.
433, 437-39 (1958) (same; death penalty case); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190-91
(1952) (upholding admissibility of confession obtained by interrogation after suspect was
slapped and kicked; death penalty case).
168. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 166, at 6-7 & nn.14-19.
169. See Schulhofer, supra note 165, at 201.
170. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006), purporting to overrule Miranda, was never invoked by
federal prosecutors, and when raised by a district judge sua sponte, was held unconstitutional
in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431-32 (2000).
171. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment:A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9
(2003) (noting the public's disillusionment with rehabilitation); Ted Chiricos, The Media,
TIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5-6

Moral Panics and the Politics of Crime Control, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: POLITICS

AND POLICIES 57-58 (George F Cole & Mark G. Gertz eds., 7th ed. 1998) (arguing that the
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The Collapse suggests a more subtle possibility, however. The crimecontrol backlash that began in the late 1960s might have occurred anyway,
but, the book argues, Warren's procedural reforms generated a politics that
entrenched punitive policies for decades (p. 217). Stuntz recounts how
Ronald Reagan capitalized on law-and-order sentiment, built the coalition
that led to his election in 1980, and produced a majority for Republican
crime-control policies that Democrats too were eventually compelled to
support (pp. 237-39). Stuntz then insists that "[t]he Warren Court's criminal
procedure decisions were crucial to that process" (p. 238). And Warren was
indeed attacked as the embodiment of the soft-on-crime liberalism that Republicans opposed (p. 238). So was the Warren Court crucial to Reagan's
success, as The Collapse claims? Would the electoral outcomes have differed if the Warren Court had never existed?
There is no ironclad way to test this counterfactual, but history offers a
natural experiment that sheds light on it. Britain had no equivalent of the
Warren Court and no rule mandating suppression of evidence from an illegal
search or unwarned interrogation. 72 Its experience makes the no-Warren
counterfactual a reality and gives a reasonably good answer to the "what
if?" question. The answer is that Britain experienced virtually the same U173
turn in its domestic politics at virtually the same time as the United States.
Margaret Thatcher became prime minister in 1979 with a "law and order
administration" and an agenda that bore striking ideological similarity to
Reagan's.1 74 Profound structural changes in Western industrial society lay at
the heart of these developments, not judicial doctrine.
The Collapse's other claims about the political effects of judicial reform
also align awkwardly with this chronology. Stuntz argues that "[t]he last
century's changes in ... criminal procedure ... made the law a barrier to

reform" (p. 308). Stuntz would welcome "the undoing of the vast network of
procedural rules the Supreme Court has crafted since the early 1960s" (p.
302) and suggests that in the absence of those precedents, democratic politics would generate more effective safeguards for vulnerable defendants and

expansion of punitive measures was a response to "moral panic" resulting from media coverage of crack cocaine usage and violent crimes); Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We
Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395 (1997) (discussing how highly
publicized crimes by repeat offenders led to the passage of punitive statutes such as Three
Strikes laws).
172. At the time of Miranda, Britain required a warning of the right to remain silent, see
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 486-88, 487 n.57 (1966), but did not mandate exclusion of
confessions obtained by violating this rule, see Developments in the Law: Confessions, 79
HARV. L. REV. 935, 1093-94 (1966). That remains the law today. See David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 149, 167, 170-72 (Craig M.
Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007). Britain likewise had and has no rule mandating suppression of
illegally seized evidence. Id. at 163. In the 1970s, law-and-order concern about defense advantages centered on Britain's rule forbidding comment at trial on the defendant's silence, and
the Thatcher government enacted legislation relaxing this prohibition. See id. at 166-67.
173. See GARLAND, supra note 152, at 98-102.
174.

id. at 97-102.
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restore a world with less imprisonment and more trials (pp. 302-04, 31012).
The difficulty with this prediction is that we have already tried much of
what The Collapse proposes, and not just for a few short intervals. For most
of the past forty years, our society and our courts have aggressively rolled
back the major procedural innovations of the Warren era, either overruling
them or leaving them with little practical bite. 75 Criminal justice officials
have regained discretion to design more balanced, more creative, and possibly more effective solutions. 7 6 If Stuntz's theory were correct, we might
expect that over the past three decades the political process would have produced measures to relax harsh sentencing policies and better protect civil
liberties. Yet despite the law enforcement flexibility that the Burger,
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have reintroduced, virtually no new procedural safeguards have emerged from the political process, jury trials have
not become more common,177 and punitive policies have not recededexcept quite recently (and quite modestly) under the extreme fiscal pressure
of the 2008 financial meltdown. We have reason to be skeptical of Stuntz's
claim about counterproductive judicial reform because decades of experience have failed to confirm its causal premises.
IV. SOLUTIONS?

The Collapse seeks to guide reform by emphasizing the lessons that
flow directly from its historical analysis. "Local neighborhoods," Stuntz
argues, "should exercise more power ... as they once did" (p. 283). "The
short answer [for reform] is by making today's style of criminal justice more
democratic" (p. 287). And the book offers a wealth of original proposals for
achieving this goal-proposals that could well have value even if the book's
historical arguments are unconvincing.
Thorough assessment of these proposals would require yet another book
review-or several. But Stuntz's suggestions deserve brief treatment here
for two reasons. First, the pro-democracy theme that dominates discussion
in The Collapse-and this Review-should not divert attention from recommendations that can stand on their own merits, independent of the book's
case for decentralized political control. Second, and closer to the heart of
The Collapse, the book's concrete proposals for enhancing local democracy
expose the inherent flaws of that project.
Consider first the policy ideas that need not depend on the prodemocracy argument. To address racial disparities, Stuntz urges courts to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause more aggressively by overturning
175. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169, 195 (1976) (plurality opinion) (permitting states to reinstate the death penalty, provided they institute procedures to guide jury
sentencing discretion); cases cited supra note 164.
176. See supra note 164 (describing relaxation of Warren Court constraints on police
discretion).
177. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text (describing steady rise in prevalence of guilty pleas).
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sentences when a defendant shows that similarly situated people from other
racial groups received less severe punishments (p. 297). Unfortunately, the
difficulties of proving that different individuals are "similarly situated"
would probably render this remedy ineffective in almost all cases. The same
holds true for several other well-intentioned proposals-for example,
Stuntz's suggestion that courts hold unconstitutional the underpolicing of
minority neighborhoods (p. 291) and bar a pretext prosecution when the
government cannot show that other defendants received significant prison
time on similar low-level charges (pp. 301-02). These ideas have potential,
but the elusive proof they require makes them difficult to implement.
Another of Stuntz's suggestions is more important. Stuntz convincingly
demonstrates the need for more resources to support both prosecution and
defense.' Since voters will meet such a need only when pressured, he urges
judges to reinvigorate effective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine, either by
ordering states to spend more money on indigent defense or-more realistically-by adopting stringent standards for effective assistance in
jurisdictions that fail to71 meet
a minimum level of funding, as determined by
"expert commissions."' 9 The latter approach is eminently workable, and it
lies well within the legitimate domain of the courts.
There is nothing wrong with supplementing a pro-democracy agenda
with equal-protection and effective-assistance remedies that strike a different chord. But it is telling that a scholar so skeptical of experts and judicial
activism ultimately turned to expertise and ambitious judicial intervention as
essential tools in the struggle for criminal justice reform.
More central to Stuntz's book, however, is its ambition to restore political power to local neighborhoods. Yet when it turns to this goal, there is a
discontinuity. In earlier chapters, The Collapse criticized reforms that delivered control over police and prosecutors to city elites, taking power away
from the inner-city districts that often bear the brunt of both crime and punishment. s0 Given that diagnosis, restoring local democracy would
seemingly mean undoing the "changes [that] limited the power of residents
of poor city neighborhoods . ... to govern the police officers and prosecu-

tors who govern them" (p. 7); reform presumably would aim to restore each
neighborhood's authority to decide how its streets are patrolled, how arrests
are made there, and how offenses committed there are prosecuted.
But The Collapse makes no such recommendation. The closest it comes
is to urge that juries be drawn from the neighborhoods where crimes occur
(p. 287). In other respects, it proposes to leave decisionmaking power where
it is now-with police chiefs, district attorneys, and judges who are ac178.

Seep. 299.

179. P. 299. Going further, and presumably to give localities a strong incentive to follow
the expert recommendations, The Collapse also proposes that in jurisdictions that do so, "effective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine will not apply." P. 299. This approach would seemingly
leave no remedy for a defendant who suffers from the egregious performance of an individual
attorney. Stuntz might not have supported such a result without exceptions, but the logic of
prioritizing systemic incentives over individual justice leads in this direction.
180. See, e.g., chapters 5-6.
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countable to citywide or countywide constituencies.' Having previously
conceived decentralization as enhancing the power of neighborhoods vis-Avis cities and counties, the book now largely equates decentralization with
enhancing the power of cities and counties vis-A-vis federal and state governments.

For the book's theme-the socioeconomic locus of political power-this
shift in its conception of the local-from neighborhoods to cities and counties-is not merely a nuance but the difference between night and day.
Cities and counties are rarely, if ever, dominated in their politics by the poor,

minority neighborhoods where so much crime is concentrated. Metropolitan
counties typically encompass both disadvantaged urban areas and affluent

suburbs. New York County (Manhattan) includes some of the poorest neigh-

borhoods in the nation along with some of the wealthiest.'82 And nearly all

cities include both prosperous and poverty-stricken residential areas as well
as business districts where influential corporations have vital interests. It
was for just this reason that earlier chapters of The Collapse condemned the
migration of decisionmaking authority from high-crime neighborhoods to
the city or county level, stressing that "[t]his gives power over criminal justice to voters who have little stake in how the justice system operates" (p. 7).

Yet in its proposed solutions, The Collapse largely accepts that arrangement
and focuses on reallocating power among the city, county, state, and federal

levels.
How will changing the distribution of power among these governmental
units affect fairness in criminal justice? One of the book's intriguing suggestions is that federal and state governments should share half the costs of
local policing-now borne largely by cities-and that cities and counties
should share half the costs of incarceration-now borne largely by states (p.
289). This move, the book states, would free the smaller units of govem-

ment, which generally have more precarious finances, to invest more in
policing, and would restrain their impulse to impose harsh sentences that
they need not pay for (p. 289). This argument may be right and therefore

181. The Collapse does urge support for the "community policing" and "community
prosecution" movements, which encourage officials to build rapport with neighborhood residents and consider their priorities. Pp. 293, 305. But this approach at best gives neighborhoods
only a pallid form of influence, far short of control, and since it leaves decisionmaking power
with police and prosecutors, it has strong potential to evolve into top-down communication or
perfunctory listening sessions. The Collapse acknowledges this, pp. 293, 305, and indeed a
dominant finding has been that such programs are often little more than a "one-sided, impersonal opportunity for city bureaucrats to manufacture consent" for measures they have already
decided to implement. William Lyons, Partnerships, Information and Public Safety: Community Policing in a Time of Terror, 25 POLICING: INT'L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 530,
534 (2002); accord, SKLANSKY, supra note 6, at 83, 118.
182. See Amy O'Leary, What is Middle Class in Manhattan?,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2013,
at REl ("Household incomes in Manhattan are about as evenly distributed as they are in Bolivia or Sierra Leone-the wealthiest fifth of Manhattanites make 40 times more than the
).
lowest fifth ....
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seems worth exploring, but its effects in practice are unclear and probably
unsustainable.'83
More fundamentally, The Collapse offers no reason to assume that affluent voters and powerful economic interests are less likely to dominate
politics in cities and counties than at the federal or state level; this is at best
an open question with answers likely to vary from one locality to another.
So why doesn't The Collapse follow the logic of its diagnosis and urge a
more significant shift in political authority-from the city or county level
back to the local neighborhoods?
It is not difficult to imagine the reasons. But to understand the limits of
the appealing neighborhood-democracy idea, it is crucial to spell them out.
Our era is defined by rapid change, extraordinary mobility, and unprecedented social, ethnic, religious, cultural, and ideological heterogeneity.
Spatial integration along racial lines is not what it ought to be, and integration by economic class may be deteriorating. But even on those dimensions,
the many communities within our society are overlapping and
intersecting.'14 Consequently, it is difficult to see how we can demarcate
stable districts that are ethnically and socioeconomically homogeneous. And
even where that may be possible, we cannot plausibly assume that the people within those boundaries constitute a single "community" with coherent,
unified preferences.' 85 Property owners, tenants, shopkeepers, senior citizens, teenagers, and the homeless have divergent interests. Who speaks for
this "community"?
Other difficulties arise even if we assume that fully coherent communities exist within a city. One obstacle is interdependence; each community,
however homogeneous, affects its neighbors.'86 This point remains true even
183.

If a city runs short of money-in an economic downturn, for example-will it have

to lay off police officers so that it can afford to keep its serious offenders behind bars, or will it
have to impose shorter sentences on its offenders, while serious offenders from affluent areas

face more severe punishment? Either way, the adverse public-safety consequences for cashstrapped cities could well undermine property values, put even greater pressure on revenues,
and force an additional round of cuts to policing or sentencing, in a potentially relentless
downward spiral. But if a city cannot be put to these choices, the cost-sharing arrangement
becomes unacceptable.
Conversely, when a city wants more policing and is willing to pay its 50 percent share,
the Stuntz proposal would obligate federal and state governments to fund the rest. Affluent
cities would be the first to take advantage of this opportunity, draining the available funds.

And whether they do so or not, other levels of government will justifiably demand a say in
how the funds they provide to localities are spent, a result exactly opposite from the decentral-

ization that the proposal was supposed to further. To be sure, cities often need support from
levels of government that have a stronger tax base, and Stuntz's analysis of this need is insightful. But the project of strengthening local control is easier said than done because it is
hard to override the power of the purse-that is, to guarantee funding from the center while

decentralizing operational decisions that have fiscal implications.
184. See Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to ProfessorsMeares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 242.
185.

See SKLANSKY, supra note 6, at 116.

186. E.g., Parker, supra note 72, at 5 (describing interdependence of residents in large
American cities in the 1950s).
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with offenses that might seem quintessentially local-for example, domestic
violence or street-corner drug dealing. Much of the money flowing to dealers must come, one way or another, from sources outside the poorest
neighborhoods. And for both drugs and domestic violence, the impact on
families concerns us all. Interdependence is an unavoidable economic and
moral reality.
As a thought experiment, however, suppose that we suspend interde-pendence and posit the existence of homogeneous, self-contained political
subdivisions. Even then, localized political control remains unworkable.
Consider the fiscal dynamics. If each precinct determines its policing, charging, and sentencing practices, will each precinct also bear the fiscal costs, or
can it off-load those costs onto its neighbors? The latter answer would
quickly produce unsustainable spending. Economic and political principles
seem to require that each self-contained precinct fund its own choices. But
crime, at least street crime, is typically concentrated in the poorest neighborhoods. If each neighborhood bears only its own costs, affluent areas will
remain well protected, perhaps more so than before, while poor precincts
will have woefully insufficient resources. However the financially disadvantaged areas balance their criminal justice priorities, law enforcement
resources will almost certainly fall short, public safety will deteriorate, and
property values will decline; resources will then shrink even further, and so
on, in a relentless downward spiral.
One way out of the fiscal dilemma might be for higher levels of government to provide funding, hopefully in accordance with need. This
solution would leave each precinct to allocate the resulting resources as it
sees fit, for example, preferring more police (with perhaps greater certainty
of punishment) or longer sentences (with greater severity). Even then, anyone attentive to political incentives will see the risk that poorer districts will
be shortchanged by the affluent voters who must fund them but, by hypothesis, are insulated from the public safety consequences. It may be that only
the fact of interdependence protects poor neighborhoods from being
shortchanged even more than they already are.
Of course, The Collapse does not propose any such rearrangements.
Apart from wanting to draw juries from local neighborhoods in the case of
strictly local crimes, it leaves political power almost precisely where it is
now. Tacitly, at least, Stuntz acknowledges that law enforcement policy cannot be set, as it once was, at the neighborhood level. The upshot is that the
local-democracy project, in so far as it concerns actual political power, is
inherently unsustainable-from its simplest practical details to the principles at its core. And the power transfers that are conceivable-from judges
to any of our existing political bodies-inevitably mean transfers of power
to forums where the voice of the disadvantaged is even weaker than it is in
the courts. As Stuntz himself apparently saw when he turned to specific
remedies, vigilant judicial enforcement of important individual rights remains an essential component of successful criminal justice reform.
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CONCLUSION

Bill Stuntz's parting legacy to the criminal justice community depicts
with unparalleled force the appalling conditions that so much of the American public now takes for granted: discriminatory street stops, mindlessly
unfair and counterproductive drug policies, grossly one-sided prosecutorial
power, assembly-line conviction processes conducted behind closed doors,
brutally harsh punishments, and staggering inequality in our treatment of
racial minorities and the poor. Along with the eloquence and passion that
infuse his writing, he offers a wealth of insight into the political pathologies
that distort our funding priorities and block sensible steps toward reform.
Bill's generosity, compassion for the disadvantaged, and faith in the basic
decency of his fellow citizens inspired all who knew him or his work.
Beyond these powerful contributions, The Collapse also has an analytic
agenda-to insist on attention to the economic and political incentives that
affect institutional responses to abstract legal doctrine. That dimension is
unquestionably important, and Bill Stuntz helped enormously in bringing it
to the forefront. But The Collapse inadvertently illustrates the perils of the
enterprise. Social, fiscal, political, economic, and organizational responses
to new legal rules are terribly difficult to understand, much less foresee. And
the tools and time required to do so typically lie far beyond the reach of legal scholars, not to mention judges. Should judges allow conjecture on such
matters to influence their judgment about whether an asserted constitutional
right should be recognized?
Traditional legal analysis does not offer complete certainty either, but it
is exponentially more manageable. Our Constitution prohibits compelled
self-incrimination, 87 and the central question posed in Miranda was simply
whether the circumstances of custodial police interrogation are inherently
compelling. 8' The Warren Court's affirmative answer, if not inevitable, was
certainly a strong one because, as one of the Miranda dissenters later
acknowledged, "a suspect.., is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator."' 89 Yet the analytic framework
advocated in The Collapse pushes that issue-the possibility of inherent
compulsion-from sight; indeed, the book's discussion of Miranda does not
mention the compulsion problem at all.' 9° Whatever one might think about
187.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
188. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-67 (1966).
189. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (White, J.).
190. The Collapse instead portrays Miranda as having the ambitious goal of comprehensive systemic equality. The book declares that although Miranda made identifying the guilty
more difficult, it was "supposed to have one large compensating advantage ...promot[ing]
equality among rich and poor.... [It was] designed to persuade suspects that talking is foolish
...[and its] most likely [point] is the advancement of... equality of result: if... sophisticated suspects could game the system, the poor and the unsophisticated must be given the same
opportunity." Pp. 218, 223-24. This account leaves a quite inaccurate impression. Although
equality concerns influenced the Miranda Court and surface in some of its language, the opinion's analytic framework, ideological justification, and almost all of its discussion focus on the
issue of compulsion. Yet in spotlighting the equality subtext so strongly, The Collapse places
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Miranda, The Collapse does not deny that it protects suspects from some
compelling pressures. And that interest, though narrow, is the one that the
Constitution directs courts to address.
Similar concerns apply to Mapp.'9' The issue was whether the Constitution requires the exclusion of evidence seized in a search that violates the
Fourth Amendment. 9 The Court gave an affirmative answer, largely because it concluded that in the absence of exclusion, police would, in
practice, be free to violate the Amendment with impunity. That judgment
has solid support, and The Collapse does not suggest that the Mapp Court
was wrong to reach it. Instead the book again drives the question of constitutional interpretation into the background, leaving the soundness of Mapp
93
to turn on its political ramifications and broad systemic consequences.'
In the end, however, it will seldom be possible to predict how the world
as a whole will differ even in the short run, much less many decades down
the road, if courts decline to enforce doctrinally justified claims and leave
vulnerable individuals to the political process. Summing up Stuntz's verdict
on the Warren era-and probably his instinct about strong procedural rights
generally-The Collapse stresses that "unintended consequences often
swamp the intended kind" (p. 216). True enough. But, as David Sklansky
has rightly warned, "[wihat we know for certain is that without the Court's
involvement we would have lost the specific protections that the Court itself
provided.... [P]rimary effects are a good deal more predictable than secondary consequences, and they make a surer guide for statecraft."' 94
We see that point vindicated several times over in assessing the diagnosis and policy prescriptions offered in The Collapse. Despite the comfort
and security offered even today by small, cohesive communities, their grassroots methods of governance have little bearing on the problems faced in a
modem city; this reality was painfully clear even in Cleveland a century
ago. And despite the lure of the low-crime, low-punishment world that
America enjoyed as recently as the 1950s, that success was achieved under
social circumstances that are long gone and unlikely to return. Nostalgia for
those days is understandable. But we cannot bring them back by reinstating
the compulsion problem out of view entirely; the book's discussion of Miranda does not even
mention the word compulsion or any of its cognates.
191. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,645-46 (1961).
192. Id. at 658.
193. Like its treatment of Miranda, The Collapse suggests that "Mapp ...[was] supposed to promote equality among rich and poor." P.218. The book does recognize that one of
the Court's goals was to enforce the Fourth Amendment more effectively, p. 224, and it asserts
that a better remedy (the institutional injunction) is now available, pp. 220-21. But the book
makes this a subsidiary point and does not criticize Mapp itself on this ground. Instead, it
reasons that even though institutional injunctions were not a possibility when Mapp was decided, p. 221, the decision was nonetheless one of "Earl Warren's Errors," p. 216, because it
accepted substantive Fourth Amendment requirements at face value and sought "simply to
enforce the relevant [constitutional] rules," p. 225, without assessing their overall systemic
effects.
194. David Alan Sklansky, Killer Seatbelts and Criminal Procedure, 119 HARv. L. REV.
F 56, 64 (2006).
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the informality and localized politics that had disastrous consequences even
then. The great strength of that period-low levels of crime achieved with
low levels of punishment-was a consequence of distinctive socioeconomic
circumstances. We cannot recapture it simply by reestablishing a particular
constitutional jurisprudence.
It may be a curse of our times that the migration of power to ever-larger
political units often appears economically, fiscally, and functionally imperative. In this setting, perhaps more than ever, the broader political process
becomes an indispensable tool of social justice, but also a distant and capricious one. Independent courts must play an active role. And that remains
especially true in the domain of procedure: "[t]he history of liberty has
largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards. 195 Notwithstanding the iconoclasm of The Collapse, with its insistence that James
Madison and the Bill of Rights were deluded in their preoccupation with
procedural safeguards (pp. 79-80), it is no accident that the European Convention on Human Rights, adopted in the wake of World War 11,196
enumerated detailed criminal procedure protections and deemed them universal, judicially enforceable human rights.
It is precisely in the domain of procedure that courts have the expertise
and legitimacy to pass judgment on practices that risk unreliable adjudication and unjustified harm to individuals who cannot find protection in the
political process-most obviously, criminal suspects and others whom the
government targets when the political branches consider them dangerous. If
we are to reverse "the collapse" of American criminal justice, we could well
begin by insisting that our judiciary reclaim its indispensable role as the
buffer between vulnerable individuals and the power-stronger and less
bounded today than ever before-of police, prosecutors, and the passions of
the political majority.

195. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
196. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 5,
6, 19, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 226, 228, 234.

